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The Legal Framework for SEP Disputes in EU Post-Huawei: Whither Harmonization? 
Nicolo Zingales* 
Abstract 
 
This article revisits the antitrust treatment of unilateral conduct in Standard Essential Patent 
(SEP) disputes in EU, with particular focus on the landmark CJEU judgment in Huawei v 
ZTE and the way it has affected subsequent developments before national courts. It explains 
that while the Court in Huawei significantly improved legal certainty both for SEP holders 
and their potential licensees, it also left open a number of crucial questions affecting 
everyday’s licensing practice. First, it is not entirely clear whether the liability of an SEP 
holder presupposes leveraging by a vertically integrated firm or can also arise in purely 
vertical or horizontal relationships. Secondly, the safe harbor procedure formulated in the 
judgment begs important questions concerning burden of proof and portfolio licensing, which 
have given rise to divergent interpretations. It follows that the space remains wide open for 
competing national and even regional approaches to the rights and obligations of SEP 
holders, calling for further European harmonization- be it judicially, legislatively, or 
administratively through the European Commission. In support for the latter measures, the 
article illustrates the limited remit of EU private international law rules in preventing the 
forum shopping which is likely to unfold as a result of a fragmented landscape for the 
resolution of SEP disputes, and the limited ability of the Unified Patent Court to ameliorate 
the associated fragmentation and coordination problems.  
 
Keywords: Standard Essential Patents; Injunctions; Huawei v ZTE; Forum Shopping; Recast 
Regulation. 
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Introduction 
On October 13, 2017, Bloomberg News reported that Qualcomm filed lawsuits against Apple 
in China seeking to ban the sale and manufacture of iPhones in the country1. As that article 
explains, the lawsuit is the latest episode in a multi-jurisdictional battle between the two 
companies concerning royalties expected by Qualcomm for Apple’s use of patented chipset 
technologies, which enable connection to the cellular network. The legal dispute originates 
from the iPhone’s use of chipsets reading on communications standards such as LTE, CDMA 
and UMTS, which makes a license from Qualcomm necessary for sales of products relying 
on those standards. Apple was actually the initiator in this battle by filing suit in California in 
January 2017 claiming that Qualcomm overcharged for its patents, in particular by 
demanding royalties that reflect the relative contribution of the technology to the final 
product rather than the intrinsic value of the smallest saleable patent practising unit (SSPPU), 
thereby imposing a “tax on innovation”2. That move was followed by Apple’s refusal to pay 
royalties for contract manufacturers’use of Qualcomm’s patents, and a series of legal actions 
across the globe where Qualcomm is attempting in return to prevent Apple from operating 
without prior payment of those royalties in key markets, most notably the United States3, 
Europe (filing in the two jurisdictions with the most sophisticated treatment of SEP disputes)4 
and China5. 
This saga illustrates the significance of some of the most pressing legal questions concerning 
the meaning of the “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (“FRAND”) royalties that have 
been promised by manufacturers of patents deemed essential to the implementation of a given 
technology standard6 in exchange for their inclusion into the standard. As the example above 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Competition and Information Law, Sussex Law School; Extramural Fellow, Tilburg Law and 
Economics Center; Research Associate, Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology and Society; and Affiliate 
Scholar, Stanford Center for Internet and Society. I wish to thank Celine Teeuwen for the research assistance 
provided for an earlier draft of this paper. I received financial support from Qualcomm during the period in 
which research for this paper was conducted, but all ideas remain my own. 
1 Ian King, “Qualcomm Seeks China iPhone Ban, Expanding Apple Legal Fight”, Bloomberg News (13 October 
2017). https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-13/qualcomm-seeks-china-iphone-ban-escalating-
apple-legal-fight. 
2 Roger Chen, Sarah Tibken, “Apple: Qualcomm's 'illegal practices' hurt entire industry”, CNet (June 20th, 
2017), https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-qualcomms-illegal-practices-hurt-entire-industry/. 
3 Stephanie Condon, “ITC opens probe into Qualcomm's charges against Apple”, Zdnet (August 8th, 2017) 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/itc-opens-probe-into-qualcomms-charges-against-apple/. 
4 Namely, Germany and the United Kingdom. See Peter Sayer, “Qualcomm opens European front in patent war 
with Apple“, ITWorld (July 19th, 2017), https://www.itworld.com/article/3209037/mobile/qualcomm-opens-
european-front-in-patent-war-with-apple.html; Pat Treacy and Alex Calver, “Apple’s battle with Qualcomm 
spreads to the UK”, Lexology (September 1st, 2017), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bb0e2121-7ab9-4c6c-bbd4-140834002acf. 
5 See supra, note 1. 
6 While in this strand of litigation it is in dispute whether the patents are actually essential for the product in 
question (in which case, there would have been an obligation to declare such patents before the relevant 
standard-setting organization), readers should also bear in mind that Qualcomm has been previously found to 
have unlawfully bundled in its licenses both essential and non-essential patents, according to competition 
authorities in China, South Korea and Taiwan. See Ian King, “Qualcomm Fined $975 Million in China, Sets 
Licensing Rates”, Bloomberg News (February 9th, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-
09/china-fines-qualcomm-975-million-sets-patent-licensing-rates; Ian King, “Qualcomm Fined $853 Million by 
South Korean Antitrust Agency”, Bloomberg News (December 28th, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-28/qualcomm-fined-853-million-by-south-korea-s-antitrust-
agency-ix8csvth; “Qualcomm Fined Record $773 Million in Taiwan Antitrust Probe”, Bloomberg News 
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demonstrates, the interpretation of these promises is controversial, to say the least, and has in 
fact generated a significant amount of IP and antitrust litigation over the last decade. The goal 
of the present contribution, which is focused on the EU dimension of this debate, is twofold: 
first, to review the EU legal framework governing the enforcement of patents that are 
essential to the implementation of a technology standard, illustrating the tensions between 
different understandings of FRAND and the evolution of EU competition law in dealing with 
an overly permissive interpretation of this concept by patent holders; second, to expose the 
areas of uncertainty left by the latest judgment issued by the European Court of Justice in this 
area, and explore the potential problems arising from the resulting partial harmonization at 
the antitrust/IP interface.  
The article proceeds as follows: section 1 and 2.1 provide the basic background to appreciate 
the interpretative problems faced by courts in entertaining antitrust claims in disputes of the 
type discussed above. Section 1 explains the role of patents and industry standards in 
stimulating innovation, and the possible tension between those two; while section 2.1 lays out 
the legislative framework defined at the EU level for the enforcement of IP. Section 2.2 
ventures into the antitrust treatment of FRAND disputes, showing that the exercise of a patent 
holder’s right to injunctive relief may constitute an abuse of dominant position and describing 
how an abuse was in fact established in three specific cases, following a very different 
reasoning by the German Federal Court of Justice on one hand, and the European 
Commission on the other. Section 3.1 then portrays the position of the European Court of 
Justice called in Huawei v ZTE7 to resolve the contrast between these two approaches, 
untangling that ruling and the underlying reasoning.  
Readers familiar with the Huawei judgment might want to skip directly to section 3.2, which 
presents some critical analysis of the theory of harm in the judgment and of the issues left 
open for the interpretation of future court rulings. In presenting those elements, that section 
elaborates on the divergent approaches taken so far by national courts across the EU, but 
particularly in Germany. Having demonstrated the concrete danger of inconsistent 
interpretation, the article proceeds in section 4 to elucidate the prospects for strategic 
litigation by both patent holders and defendants under the applicable rules of private 
international law; and concludes showing that the establishment of the Unified Patent Court 
will not solve the problems of fragmentation and coordination that are currently caused by 
incomplete harmonization at the IP/antitrust interface. Accordingly, Section 5 concludes 
inquiring on the possible avenues for reform of the existing framework, focusing in particular 
on the pre-announced Commission Communication on “Standard Essential Patents for a 
European digitalised economy” and highlighting the virtues and perils of using soft law to 
deal with the wide range of issues that the Communication is expected to address.  
 
1. Patents, Innovation and Standardization 
The relationship between patents, standards and innovation is a complex one. On the one 
hand, the rationale of incentivizing innovation lies at the core of the right to exclude others 
from making, using or selling an invention, which is the essence of patent protection. This 
legal entitlement aims to overcome a problem of inappropriability: due to the inherent non-
excludability of information, including that constituing an invention, firms in the market 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(October 11th, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-11/qualcomm-fined-773-million-in-
taiwan-for-antitrust-violations. 
7 Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp. and ZTE Deutschland GmbH [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:477 
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could otherwise replicate an innovator’s results without incurring the investments necessary 
to generate that invention8.  
On the other hand, while the patent system relies on the fundamental premise that exclusivity 
generates innovation, it is important to bear in mind that not all innovation follows the same 
pattern. Broadly speaking, two types of innovations can be distinguished: at one end of the 
spectrum is a more radical, “breakthrough” innovation –one which breaks with the past and 
establishes a new technological paradigm. At the opposite end lies the so called 
“incremental” innovation, which does not alter the established system architecture but merely 
provides customers with “something more or better in the attributes they already value”9.  
The latter type of innovation tends to be more readily attainable10, but also to bring about a 
multitude of competing paradigms, products and processes, improving the relative status quo 
in different respects. In this scenario, technical collaboration within an industry can be 
strategic for the emergence of new products and services: first, in achieving coordination of 
otherwise competing efforts, thus accellerating or even engendering technological progress; 
and second, in promoting adoption of the resulting innovation by the relevant industry 
players.  
Standardization stimulates this process through the definition of technical standards, i.e. 
voluntary technical specifications for products, production processes, or services11. In 
particular, most relevant from a patent perspective are the so called “compatibility standards”, 
which provide a common architecture for the development of interoperable products and 
services: these specifications are built upon existing technologies, which may in turn be 
protected by patents. Therein lies the challenge at the core of the disputes discussed in this 
contribution: assertion of exclusivity in the underlying technology is in direct tension with 
standardization’s aim to enable everyone to use a common architecture for the development 
of new products and services. Specifically, the aim of promoting incremental innovation 
served by standard-setting organizations (SSOs) is in tension with the right of holders of 
patents that are necessary for a given standard (so called “Standard Essential Patents”, 
hereinafter “SEPs”) to prevent any manufacturer of standard-compliant products to obtain a 
license. For this reason, standard-setting organizations (“SSOs”) formulate IPR policies that 
strive to ensure the accessibility of standards, while preserving SEP holders’ ability to receive 
a fair compensation for the use of their patents. IPR policies typically contain to that end two 
specific sets of rules on the disclosure and licensing of IPRs -SEPs in particular. First, they 
                                                          
8 Kenneth J. Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention”, in The Rate and 
Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors , Kenneth J. Arrow ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1962): 615, 617. 
9 Joseph Bower and Clayton Christensen, “Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave”, 73 Harvard Business 
Review 43 (1995), 45. This dichotomy is obvioulsy a stylized picture of innovation, which has been divided by 
others in four different categories (radical, modular, architectural and incremental) depending on the level of 
disruptiveness and its relation to the architecture or the component: see Rebecca M. Henderson and Kim B. 
Clark, “Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of 
Established Firms”, Administrative Science Quarterly 35 (1990): 9-30 (1990). Some have also distinguished 
between on the one hand “incremental” and “breakthrough”, reflecting Bower & Christensen’s model, and on 
the other hand “sustaining” and “disruptive”, depending on the relationship with what they call the “value 
network” around innovation. See Alexandre De Streel & Pierre Larouche, “Disruptive Innovation and 
Competition Policy”, background note for the Session III of the OECD Global Forum on Competition, on 29-30 
October 2015, paras. 3-4.  
10 See e.g. Roy Rothwell and Paul Gardner, “The strategic management of re-innovation”, R & D Management 
19, 2 (1989): 147-160. 
11 See Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of 25 October 2012 on European standardization [2012] OJ L 316/12, 
Rec. (1). 
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require SSO members to disclose within the standard-setting process the existence of any 
patents that they consider necessary for the standard that is being defined12. Second, they 
establish a mechanism that limits the discretion of SEP holders to refuse to license such 
patents to standard implementers. The most common of such mechanism is requiring SEP 
holders to make a so called “FRAND commitment”, i.e. a commitment to make certain 
patents available to future standard implementers on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
terms.13  
However, both ‘fair and reasonable’ and ‘nondiscriminatory’ remain rather high-level and 
abstract concepts, escaping straightforward definition and calling for a case-by-case 
assessment. Practical experience shows that companies tend to struggle with the fundamental 
uncertainty that the FRAND framework generates,14 as patent holders and implementers often 
have widely different views on what FRAND entails. For example, parties may disagree as to 
whether license royalties should be based on the incremental value of the SEP after it has 
been included in the standard, or based solely on the intrinsic value of the invention before its 
inclusion in the standard.15 Furthermore, in addition to controversies surrounding the 
appropriate royalty base, different approaches exist also with regard to factors that ought to 
be taken into account for the computation of royalty rates.16 
                                                          
12 See Jorge L. Contreras, “An Empirical Study of the Effects of Ex Ante Licensing Disclosure Policies on the 
Development of Voluntary Technical Standards” (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011); Jorge 
L. Contreras, “Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical Study”, 
Jurimetrics Journal 53 (2013): 163–211. 
13 Jorge L. Contreras, “Rethinking RAND: SDO-based Approaches to Patent Licensing Commitments” (2012) 
ITU Patent Roundtable Geneva, 2 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2159749>. 
14 Renata Hesse, “Six ‘Small’ Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch” (2012) Remarks as Prepared for the ITU-T 
Patent Roundtable Geneva < https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518951/download>. 
15 See e.g. the discussions in Yann Ménière, “Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Licensing 
Terms: Research Analysis of a Controversial Concept” [2015] JRC Science and Policy Report 17; Damien 
Geradin, “Pricing Abuses by Essential Patent Holders in a Standard-Setting Context: A View from Europe”, 
Antitrust Law Journal 76 (2009): 329; Norman V. Siebrasse and Thomas F. Cotter, “The Value of the 
Standard”, 101 Minnesota Law Review (2016). It should be noted that the prevailing view is currently in favor 
of the former interpretation: see e.g. CSIRO v. Cisco Sys. Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1304-05 (Fed. Cir. 2015). See 
Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] C 11/1 , para. 289: “it may be possible to compare the licensing fees 
charged by the company in question for the relevant patents in a competitive environment before the industry 
has been locked into the standard (ex ante) with those charged after the industry has been locked in (ex post). 
This assumes that the comparison can be made in a consistent and reliable manner”. See also Federal Trade 
Commission, “The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notices and Remedies with Competition” (March 
2011), establishing that: 
- The incremental value of the patented invention over the next-best alternative establishes the maximum 
amount that a willing licensee would pay in a hypothetical negotiation (p 21). 
- A reasonable royalty damages award that is based on high switching costs, rather than the ex ante value 
of the patented technology compared to alternatives, overcompensates the patentee. It improperly 
reflects the economic value of investments by the infringer (p 189). 
- A definition of RAND based on the ex ante value of the patented technology at the time the standard is 
set is necessary for consumers to benefit from competition among technologies to be incorporated into 
the standard – competition that the standard setting process itself otherwise displaces (p 194). 
- For a patent subject to a RAND commitment, courts should cap the royalty at the incremental value of 
the patented technology over alternatives available at the time the standard was defined (p 23). 
16 See e.g. Damien Geradin, “Standardization and Technological Innovation: Some Reflections on Ex-ante 
Licensing, FRAND, and the Proper Means to Reward Innovators”, World Competition: Law and Economcis 
Review 29, 4, (2006): 517; Gregory J. Sidak, “The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties”, Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 9 (2013): 931. See also David Long, “Federal Circuit provides guidance on 
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Given the open-ended character of these concepts, it is natural to observe litigation revolving 
around the concrete meaning of FRAND. Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate that its 
open-ended character is essential for FRAND to serve as bridge between two different 
categories of market participants: patent holders and standard implementers17. FRAND 
enables SSOs to bring everyone aboard for a particular standard through the conclusion of 
incomplete contracts in a context where it is not possible, or would be excessively costly, to 
address all future contingencies.18 For this reason, it is generally argued that FRAND should 
be construed as reference not to a specific royalty rate, but rather to a range of rates that 
accounts for those contingencies.19 In short, SEP holders retain significant flexibility in 
setting royalty amounts, but have foregone their freedom to charge licensees any rate they 
wish. One may well argue that patent holders who joined standardization efforts have done so 
sacrificing part of their reward for innovation; however, it should not be neglected that this is 
an SEP holder’s entirely voluntary choice, made in the attempt to derive greater 
compensation from wider commercialization of that invention, and furthering a conscious 
policy effort to promote diffuse and incremental innovation.   
2. The legal framework for SEP disputes in the EU 
2.1  The legislative framework around FRAND 
 
As noted, FRAND licensing is promising in theory, but controversial in practice. If SEP 
holder and implementer are not able to come to an agreement, this has one notable 
consequence: the implementer will not be authorized to produce standard-compliant features. 
However, if the implementer decides to proceed with implementation of the standard despite 
the lack of agreement– e.g. because he cannot afford to delay its production in order not to 
lose ground to his competitors – he will incur potential liability for use of the patent. The 
qualification of liability as “potential” is key here, because an implementer can always rebut 
in court the two presumptions operating in favor of patent holders, one concerning the 
validity of a granted patent and the other concerning the actual essentiality of a patent that has 
been declared so before an SSO20. There may indeed be discrepancies between the real 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
royalty determination for standard essential patents (CSIRO v. Cisco)”, Essential Patent Blog (3 December 
2015), at http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2015/12/federal-circuit-provides-guidance-on-royalty-
determination-for-standard-essential-patents-csiro-v-cisco/. 
17 See in this sense CEN-CENELEC’s position paper “Standard Essential Patents and Fair, Reasonable and 
Non-Discriminatory Commitments” (September 2016), available at 
<http://www.cencenelec.eu/News/Policy_Opinions/PolicyOpinions/EssentialPatents.pdf>, p. 14. See also 
Nicolo Zingales and Olia Kanevskaia, “The IEEE-SA patent policy update under the lens of EU competition 
law”, European Competition Journal 12, 2 (2016): 6-7. 
18 Damien Geradin, “The Meaning of ‘Fair and Reasonable’ in the Context of Third-Party Determination of 
FRAND Terms”, George Mason Law Review 21 (2014): 929. Joanna Tsai & Joshua D. Wright, “Standard 
Setting, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Role of Antitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts”, Antitrust 
Law Journal 80, 1 (2015). 
19 See e.g. Gregory J. Sidak, “The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties”, Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics 9, 4 (2013): 931-1055. 
20 For example, the implementer may prove that despite falling into the SSO’s definition of essentiality, a patent 
is not essential from a strictly technical perspective, as it can be designed around in order to implement the 
standard in question. The meaning of “essentiality” depends on the rules of the relevant SSO, and may in 
particular refer not only to technical, but also commercial essentiality – ie that non-infringing alternatives may 
exist but are (from the declaring entity’s perspective) too expensive or cumbersome. A recent study by the 
National Academy of Science and the United States Patent and Trademark Office identified two SSOs in the 
ICT sector (IEEE and VITA) including a “commercial” notion of essentiality in their IPR policy, and one 
(ETSI) specifically excluding it. See Keith Maskus and Stephen A. Merrill, Patent Challenges for Standard-
Setting in the Global Economy: Lessons from Information and Communication Technology (National Academy 
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bearing of a patent for a particular standard and the self-declaration of essentiality made by 
its holder to an SSO, which constitutes an artificial mechanism necessary to enable 
standardization to unfold quickly and keep apace with the development of technologies 
relying upon it. Not only the speed, but also the very effectiveness of standardization could 
be comprised if SSO members had the burden to identify or verify the scope of technological 
solutions covered by each patent declared as essential to a given standard.  
Another crucial feature for the effectiveness of this process, although operating more in the 
backdrop of the SSO’s work, is the availability of injunctions21. Without injunctions, SEP 
holders would be unlikely to join standardization efforts as this would imply relinquishing 
their ability to prevent unwilling licensees, who fail to meet the conditions for their proposed 
(FRAND) licensing agreement, from continuing to operate or sell their products on the 
market. On the other hand, there is also a risk that injunctions be used by SEP holders as a 
threat forcing implementers to agree to above-FRAND royalties for the patents that they need 
to use, or keep competitors out from the SEP-based markets altogether. It is therefore useful 
to review the rules set up by the EU in this regard.  
The availability of injunctions in national IP law is mandated in the EU by the IPR 
Enforcement Directive (hereinafter, “the Directive”)22, enacted with the explicit goal to 
ensure a high, equivalent and homogeneous level of protection of IP across Member States23. 
The Directive requires Member States to provide the right to provisional measures (including 
preliminary injunctions) before a decision on the merits, particularly where any delay would 
cause irreparable harm to the holder of an intellectual property right.24 With specific regard to 
injunctions, the Directive also prescribes that IPR holders should be able to apply for an 
injunction against “an intermediary whose services are being used by a third party to infringe 
the right holder’s industrial property”25. The conditions and procedures relating to such 
injunctions are largely left to national law, but important requirements are set out by the 
Directive.   
First, article 3 requires EU Member States to generally provide for measures, procedures and 
remedies that are necessary to ensure proper enforcement of IPRs. In line with the Directive’s 
objective to ensure minimum standards of IP enforcement, it places an important focus on the 
fact that those measures, procedures and remedies be ‘fair and equitable’, ‘effective’ and 
‘dissuasive’ and not be ‘unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-
limits or unwarranted delays’. At the same time however, limitations are imposed by 
requiring that they be proportionate, provide safeguards against abuse and do not create 
barriers to trade between member states.26  
Secondly and more specifically, article 9 of the Directive addresses provisional and 
precautionary measures by requiring that judicial authorities be empowered, upon request of 
the applicant, to “issue against the alleged infringer an interlocutory injunction intended to 
prevent any imminent infringement of an intellectual property right, or to forbid, on a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Press 2013): 38. 
21 According to the definition given by the European Commission, an injunction is ‘an order granted by a court 
or an administrative body whereby someone is required to perform or to refrain from performing a specific 
action.’ See European Commission, ‘Injunctions’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/enforcement/injunctions/index_en.htm> . 
22 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L195/16 (Enforcement Directive). 
23 Id., recital 10 
24 Id., recital 22. 
25 Id., recital 23, and art. 9 (1) (a). 
26 Id., art 3 (2). 
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provisional basis and subject, where appropriate, to a recurring penalty payment where 
provided for by national law, the continuation of the alleged infringements of that right (..)”.27  
Third and finally, article 11 of the Directive addresses permanent injunctions, requiring 
Member States to ensure that, “where a judicial decision is taken finding an infringement of 
an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities may issue against the infringer an 
injunction aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the infringement”.28 This type of 
injunction is clearly of paramount importance once an infringement has been established, but 
often not as crucial as interlocutory injunctions in securing effective enforcement in fast-
moving markets, such as those involving SEP-based technologies.  
As explained by a Commission Staff Working Document in 2010, significant variations exist 
at the national level in this regard29. Although the Commission found the experience with 
article 9 injunctions across EU jurisdictions positive, both in terms of speed and in 
encouraging amicable settlements, the evidence gathered from national implementations 
revealed divergence in the evidence required by courts in Member States, often to a 
substantial degree in patent infringement cases30. Furthermore, the minimal harmonization 
approach has led to the stipulation into some national laws of additional conditions to be 
satisfied for the issuance of an injunction, as well as different ranges of factors considered by 
courts when deciding over requests for injunctive relief31.  
 
2.2      Injunctions and abuse of dominance 
a. The tension between the right to an injunction and article 102 TFEU 
 
While intellectual property laws provide right-holders with certain rights, including that to an 
injunction in accordance with the aforementioned articles, EU competition law imposes 
certain limits to the exercise of such rights. Article 102 TFEU, in particular, applies to 
undertakings holding a dominant position in a relevant market, and prohibits conduct which 
amounts to abuse of such position. For the application of that prohibition, two basic elements 
need to be satisfied. We consider below the application of each of those elements to the 
context of an IP holder seeking injunctive relief, with particular focus on FRAND-
encumbered patents32.  
The first element is the identification of dominance. Dominance depends on the definition of 
the relevant market and the position that undertaking has on that market. It should be noted 
                                                          
27 Id., art 9 (emphasis added). 
28 Id., art 11 (emphasis added).  
29 Commission, 'Commission Staff Working Document: Analysis of the application of Directive 2004/48/EC of 
the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights in 
the Member States’ COM (2010) 779 final. 
30 Id., 14.  
31 See Pierre Larouche and Nicolo Zingales, “Injunctive Relief in Disputes Related to Standard-Essential 
Patents: Time for the CJEU to Set Fair and Reasonable Presumptions”, European Competition Journal 10, 3, 
(2014): 564-577 
32 It is worth noting, however, that the formulation of a FRAND-specific theory of harm for SEP disputes is not 
in itself immune from problems, as it creates imbalances with non-encumbered SEPs and perverse incentives for 
SEP holders. See Pierre Larouche and Nicolo Zingales, “Injunctive Relief in FRAND Disputes in the EU – 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law at the Remedies Stage”, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2017-004 
and Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 01/2017, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2909708; Cambridge Handbook of Technical 
Standardization, Jorge L. Contreras ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).  
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that, while firms in high tech markets often exhibit many features that are indicative of 
market power33 (high market shares, network effects, and even considerable profit margins34), 
that does not necessarily mean that they have the requisite ‘ability to behave to an appreciable 
extent independently of [their] competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers’35. Nor 
can the mere grant of a patent simply be equated with that ability36, since using the patented 
product or method may be merely one way amongst many to satisfy consumer demand in the 
relevant market. The inclusion of a patent in a standard may lead to such patent being the 
preferred alternative to satisfying consumers in that market, but there is no reason why this 
should change the underlying reasoning37. One could argue that even commercially 
convenient (as opposed to commercially essential) patents tend to yield market power, but a 
case by case analysis is necessary- and indeed explicitly required by the Commission for 
SEPs38. For example, there may be other products within the same relevant market that are 
made to competing standards, non-standardized products, and countervailing buyer power 
constraining the ability of the SEP holder from behaving independently.  
In his opinion delivered to the CJEU in the Huawei case39, Advocate General Wathelet 
stressed the importance of properly undertaking the assessment of market power: though 
conceding the applicability of a presumption of dominance for SEP holders as defined by the 
referring court, he noted that, given the “special responsibility” attached to the notion of 
dominance, it “must be possible to rebut that presumption with specific, detailed evidence”.  
The Advocate General did not elaborate on the type of evidence he would envisage as being 
sufficient to rebut that presumption. However, the so called “proximity principle” in the 
establishment of the burden of proof suggests that when it comes to evidence of substitution, 
the burden would indeed be more properly situated within the SEP holder’s purview, who has 
privileged access to data about (often confidential) licensing agreements40. The same could 
arguably be said with regard to claims of countervailing buyer power.  
Unfortunately, the CJEU chose to address the question of “abuse of dominant position” 
without focusing on the distinct notion of “dominance”, on ground that this aspect was not 
contested before the referring court. In contrast, the presumption suggested by the Advocate 
General was recently applied by the UK High Court in its recent Unwired Planet judgment41, 
suggesting that the absence of a ruling on this point by the CJEU can be taken as an 
endorsement of the permissibility of the presumption that underlied the preliminary reference 
made to it42. While that interpretation is questionable, the judgment is helpful in clarifying the 
relevance of some of the concepts that contribute to the definition of market power, 
irrespective of the application of that presumption. First, judge Birss found that the relevant 
market was that for licenses, rather than technology: in his own words, “it is licences that the 
                                                          
33 Miguel Rato and Nicolas Petit, “Abuse of Dominance in Technology-enabled Markets: Established Standards 
Reconsidered?”, European Competition Journal 9 (2013): 8. 
34 Robert Bork and Gregory J. Sidak, “The Misuse of Profit Margins to Infer Market Power”, Journal of 
Competition law & Economics 9, 3 (2013): 511, 512. 
35 As required under the working definition of dominance in EU competition law. Case 27/76 United Brands 
Company and United Brand Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities - Chiquita Bananas 
[1978] ECR 207. 
36  See case 6/73 Commercial Solvents [1974] ECR 00223, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18. 
37 Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements, supra note 15, para 269. 
38 Id. 
39 Supra note 7. 
40 Cristina Volpin, “The ball is in your court: Evidential burden of proof and the proof- proximity principle in 
EU competition law”, Common Market Law 51 (2014): 1173 
41 Unwired Planet International Ltd v. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 (Eng.). 
42 Id., para. 634. 
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SEP owner is offering, and a licence is the thing which protects the implementer from the risk 
of exclusion”43. What implementers seek is legitimate access to the interoperability 
information (which is already available on the market), not to actually buy the patents 
involved44. This characterization puts the SEP holder in a 100% market share position, but 
that is not in itself conclusive of the ability to behave independently from customers and 
competitors. Therefore, judge Birss turned to two additional sets of issues apt to 
counterbalance the weight of market shares: (i) the effectiveness of FRAND commitments, 
and (ii) the existence of countervailing buyer power. On (i) he found that, irrespective of 
whether the mere existence of FRAND commitment should be considered as restraining 
market power (something on which he preferred not to take a position), there was concrete 
evidence that after their adoption in relation to the patents in dispute, royalties had 
decreased45. On (ii), judge Birss found both theoretical potential and concrete evidence 
supporting Unwired’s claim that Huawei had countervailing buyer power46. However, he also 
noted that such power must be proven to exist in relation not only to a particular customer, 
but to the entire set of customers, and to the relevant degree so as to demonstrate an ability to 
behave independently47. As a result of the analysis of (i) and (ii), judge Birss found the 
argument of countervailing buyer insufficiently supported by economic evidence to rebut the 
finding of dominance48. All in all, although the judgment does not explain further how to 
substantiate such claims, it does take the analysis one step further than Advocate General’s 
proposed presumption, providing a helpful framing for questions of market definition and 
market power in SEP disputes.    
The second analytical element, once the existence of substantial market power has been 
ascertained, is the qualification of a given conduct as an abuse. Specifically, the relevant 
question for present purposes is whether the use of an injunction for a FRAND-encumbered 
SEP may constitute an abuse of dominant position. In principle, the answer to this question 
depends on whether the SEP holder is relying on the litigation process simply as a 
mechanism to enforce its FRAND entitlement, or rather as a strategic means to expand the 
scope of such entitlement. EU competition law has a specific line of cases dealing with 
vexatious litigation, revolving around two cumulative elements: (a) the claim can be 
reasonably expected not to succeed in court; and (b) the court proceeding is part of a plan to 
eliminate all competition49. While one could debate the fulfillment of the first condition for 
an injunction sought in conjunction with an above-FRAND licensing offer, the rigidity of the 
second prong makes this test ill-suited to dealing with injunctions that are merely aimed at 
obtaining above-FRAND rates (an exploitative purpose), as opposed to the elimination of 
competitors from the secondary market where license to that SEP is needed (an exclusionary 
purpose).  
The same problem arises with regard to the possible framing of such conduct as a 
constructive refusal to license intellectual property. For such refusal to fall foul of EU 
competition law, it is necessary that it meets four conditions: (a) it relates to a product or 
service indispensable to the exercise of a particular activity on a neighboring market; (b) it 
excludes effective competition on that market; (c) it prevents the appearance of a new product 
                                                          
43 Id., para. 659. 
44 Id., paras. 658 and 660. 
45 Id., para. 656. 
46 Id., paras. 665, 667 and 668. 
47 Id., para. 646. 
48 Id., para. 670. 
49 Case T-111/96 ITT Promedia NV v Commission [1998] II-2937. 
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for which there is potential customer demand; and (d) it is not objectively justified50. This test 
refers to a particular notion of refusal, whereby an IP holder prevents a competitor from 
entering a market with untapped potential, which is inadequate to address disagreements in 
the negotiation of SEP royalties when parties do not compete in the downstream product 
market. . 
This is a limitation that competition enforcers on the other side of the Atlantic are 
comfortable with51, but does not bode well with the scope of EU competition law. This does 
not mean that EU competition law should have a role to play when it comes to disagreements 
on royalties that form part of a regular bargaining process (that is, within FRAND ranges): 
the case-law on “excessive pricing” under article 102 TFEU has circumscribed its concern for 
prices when those are “unfair”, either because of very significantly high margins, or because 
of a gross disproportionateness when compared with the prices offered by competitors52. 
Scholars have suggested that, in light of the inherent difficulty for competition authorities to 
conduct an appropriate pricing analysis taking into account all relevant considerations, these 
cases should be brought only in very narrow circumstances53. Advocate General Wahl has 
even gone as far as to argue that such circumstances should be limited to regulated markets.54 
However, in the context of standard-setting, high prices can be a serious concern in light of 
the key role of standards in providing access to the market for new (standard-compliant) 
products. As argued by Lemley and Shapiro55, this crucial role calls for a closer scrutiny over 
royalty demands, and relatedly, over the ability to enforce such demands through injunctive 
relief: licensing negotiations can be significantly affected by the threat of an injunction, 
especially when it concerns a patent covering a small component of a complex, profitable, 
and popular product product. If the defendant has already invested heavily to design, 
manufacture, market, and sell the product with the allegedly infringing feature, an injunction 
                                                          
50 Case T-201/04 Microsoft [2007] ECR II-03601, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, paras. 322-334. 
51 See e.g. Joshua D Wright, “SSOs, FRAND, and Antitrust: Lessons from the Economics of Incomplete 
Contracts”, Remarks at the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property Inaugural Academic Conference 
“The Commercial Function of Patents in Today’s Innovation Economy”, George Mason University School of 
Law, Arlington, VA September 12, 2013, pp. 12, 32. Maureen K Olhausen, “The Elusive Role of Competition 
in the Standard-Setting Antitrust Debate”, Stanford Technology Law Review 20, 93 (2017), 121, 131, 132. 
52 Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v. Commission, [1978] ECR-207 at 
§250. 
53 The literature is divided concerning the specific circumstances under which scrutiny over prices is 
appropriate, as summarized in Massimo Motta and Alexandre De Streel, “Excessive Pricing in Competition 
Law: Never say Never?”, The Pros and Cons of High Prices, Swedish Competition Authority ed. (Stockholm: 
Konkurrensverket Swedish Competition Authority, 2007): 18. In particular, Evans and Padilla suggest that 
intervention is warranted only if the firm is a monopolist or quasi-monopolist, its prices widely exceed its total 
costs, and there is a risk that it might prevent the emergence of new products in adjacent markets. Paulis simply 
focuses on the existence of high and long-lasting barriers to entry and expansion. Similarly, O'Donoghue and 
Padilla require strong market power, the existence of high entry barriers, and a minor role of investment and 
innovation in the affected market. Röller suggests focusing again on the existence of significant entry barriers, 
but also requires that the market be unlikely to self-correct, that the dominant position was due to exclusionary 
abuse or government actions, and that there is no effective regulation and no structural remedy available. Motta 
and de Streel’s proposal is an evolution of all these approaches by requiring that, in addition to high non-
transitory barriers leading to a super dominant position and a link between dominance and past abuses or special 
and exclusive rights, there be no regulator and no effective way for the competition authority to eliminate the 
entry barriers. See id., 22-28. 
54 Opinion of AG Wahl of 6 April 2017 in Case C-177/16, Biedrība ‘Autortiesību un komunicēšanās 
konsultāciju aģentūra – Latvijas Autoru apvienība’ v Konkurences padome, para. 48.  
55 Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, “Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking”, Texas Law Review 85 (2007):1991-
2049. 
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may lead to a holdup56: in particular, a specific type of holdup called “patent holdup”, where 
the threat of injunction is used by an SEP holder to exploit his own privileged position in 
order to extract excessively high royalties57. As a corollary of this theory, it has been argued 
by many that a FRAND commitment includes (or should include) forbearance of the right to 
seek an injunction for the technologies covered by the standard before a final determination 
over the consistency with FRAND of the offers made by the alleged infringer58.   
As explained above, however, the availability of injunctive relief (and especially 
interlocutory injunctions) is crucial to patent holders’ submission to the standardization 
process. Depriving them of their right to injunction would be sensible in a world of perfect 
compliance, but in a more realistic world, one should recognize the likelihood of abuse by 
standard implementers, who might take advantage of the SEP holders’ inability to prevent 
sale, use or production of a standard-implementing product by offering to take a license on 
below-FRAND royalties.  This is particularly likely if negotiation occurs (as it is the case for 
SSOs) when patentees have already sunk their R&D costs59. If patent holders have no “stick”, 
such as the prospect of injunctive relief to guard against misconduct by potential licensees, 
standard implementers are incentivized to demand licenses on below-FRAND rates, since in 
the case of failed negotiation SEP holders will only be able to resort to costly and time-
consuming actions for damages. Under this scenario, SEP holders would be likely to grant 
licenses below FRAND terms, and even below an expected damages award, in order to 
recoup the sunk investment and forego costly and time-consuming litigation, where among 
other things they would face the risk of having their patents invalidated or declared non 
essential60. This situation of systematic undercompensation has become known as “reverse 
                                                          
56 Id., 1993. In economic terms, the term “holdup” refers to a situation where (1) a party makes asset-specific 
investment which make it difficult to shift to other opportunities once made; and (2) the party that has 
contracted to buy the goods which takes advantage of the opportunity by exploiting the switching costs. See 
Anne Layne-Farrar, “Patent Holdup and `Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence; Where Do We Stand After 15 
Years of History?”, background material for Item VII of the 122nd meeting of the OECD Competition 
Committee on 17-18 December 2014, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%282014%2984&d
oclanguage=en. The “patent holdup” theory constitutes an application of the more general “holdup” theory 
developed in the early 80s by Chicagoan economist Williamson. See Oliver Williamson, “Credible 
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange”, American Economics Review 73 (1983): 519; Oliver 
Williamson, The Economics Institutions of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press ,1985). For a more nuanced 
definition, see Thomas F Cotter, “Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses” The Journal of 
Corporation Law 34 (2009): 1151. 
57 Carl Shapiro, “Injunctions, Hold-Up and Patent Royalties”, American Law and Economics Review 12, 2 
(2010): 283. 
58 For example, in a joint statement in January 2013, the US Patent and Trademark Office and the Antitrust 
Division of the US Department of Justice declared that “the availability of injunctive relief to holders of 
FRAND-encumbered patents may harm competition and consumers by degrading one of the tools SDOs employ 
to mitigate the threat of such opportunistic actions by the holders of FRAND-encumbered patents that are 
essential to their standards”. See US DOJ and US PT, “Policy Statement on Remedies For Standards- Essential 
Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments”, 8 January 2013, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%282014%2984&d
oclanguage=en. See also Third Party US FTC’s statement on the public interest” filed on June 6, 2012, in Re 
Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music & Data Processing Devices, Computers & 
Components Thereof (establishing that injunctive relief is unavailable for infringement of a FRAND-
encumbered patent). See also Maurits Dolmans, “Standards for Standards”, Fordham  International Law 
Journal 26 (2002): 205; Joseph S. Miller, “Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and 
the Theory of the Firm”, Indiana Law Review  40 (2007): 386. 
59 Richard Gilbert, “Deal or no Deal? Licensing Negotiations by Standard Development Oraganizations”, 
Antitrust Law Journal 77 (2011): 855-888. 
60 Pierre Larouche, Jorge Padilla, and Richard Taffet, “Settling FRAND Disputes: Is Mandatory Arbitration a 
Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Alternative?”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 10, 3 (2014); 
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holdup61”.  
Whether the reality is more accurately reflecting a “holdup” or a “reverse holdup” situation 
has been heavily debated in academic, policy and industry circles, without sufficient evidence 
being found in favor of either62. Unsurprisingly, the inconclusiveness of this discussion goes 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Anne Layne-Farrar, “The Economics of FRAND” in Antitrust Intellectual Property and High Tech Handbook, 
Daniel Sokol ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
61 See e.g. Damien Geradin, “Reverse Hold-Ups: The (Often Ignored) Risks Faced by Innovators in 
Standardized Areas” in The Pros and Cons of Standard Setting, Swedish Competition Authority ed., 
(Stockholm: Swedish Competition Authority, 2012): 112. 
62 Although the literature questioning theory and evidence of patent holdup is significant and growing, it does 
not go as far as offering empirical evidence of reverse holdup. See Alexandre Galetovic and Stephen Haber, 
“The Fallacies of the Holdup Theory”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics 13, 1 (2017). Richard A. 
Epstein and Kayvan B. Noroozi, “Why Incentives for “Patent Holdout” Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and 
Why It Matters”, Berkeley Technology Law Journal (Forthcoming, 2017), available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913105; Gregory J. Sidak,  “Does the International Trade Commission Facilitate 
Patent Holdup?”, The Criterion Journal on Innovation 1 (2016); Reply Submission on the Public Interest of 
Federal Trade Commissioners Maureen K. Ohlhausen and Joshua D. Wright – In the Matter of Certain 3G 
Mobile Handsets and Components Thereof – U.S. International Trade Commission (July 2015) 
<https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ documents/public_statements/685811/150720itcreplyohlhausen-wright.pdf>; 
Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber and Ross Levine, “An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-Up” Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics 11, 5  (2015); Gregory J. Sidak, “The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of 
Standard-Essential Patents”, Georgetown Law Journal Online 104 (2015); Gregory J. Sidak, “The Meaning of 
FRAND, Part II: Injunctions” Journal of Competition Law and Economics 11 (2015); Anne Layne-Farrar, 
“Patent Holdup And Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence: Where Do We Stand After 15 Years of History?” 
(December 2014), Submission for Item VII of the 122nd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 17–
18 December 2014 
<http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%282014%2984& 
doclanguage=en>; Joshua D. Wright and Douglas H. Ginsburg, “Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: A 
Competition Cure for a Litigation Disease”, Antitrust Law Journal 79 (2014); Kirti Gupta and Mark Snyder, 
“Smart Phone Litigation and Standard Essential Patents”, Hoover IP2 Working Paper Series No 14006 (May 
2014), <http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492331; Colleen V. Chien, “Holding Up and 
Holding Out”, Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review 21, 1 (2014); Roger G. Brooks, ‘SSO 
Rules, Standardization, and SEP Licen- sing: Economic Questions from the Trenches’ Journal of Competition 
Law and Economics 9 (2013); Kirti Gupta, “The Patent Policy Debate in the High-Tech World”, Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 9 (2013); Sir Robin Jacob, “Competition Authorities Support Grasshoppers: 
Competition Law as a Threat to Innovation”, Competition Policy International 9 (2013); James Ratliff and 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “The Use and Threat of Injunctions in the RAND Context”, Journal of Competition Law 
and Economics 9 (2013); Gregor Langus, Vilen Lipatov and Damien Neven, “Standard-Essential Patents: Who 
Is Really Holding Up (and When)?” Journal of Competition Law and Economics 9 (2013); Richard A. Epstein, 
F. Scott Kieff and Daniel F. Spulber, “The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private 
Coordination” Journal of Competition Law and Economics  8 (2012); Richard S. Taffet and Hill B. Wellford, 
“Questioning the FTC’s Incremental Value Test and Claims of Widespread Hold-Up in Technology Standards”, 
Antitrust Buletin 57 (2012); Luke Froeb, Bernhard Ganglmair and Gregory J. Werden, “Patent Hold-Up and 
Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation” Journal of Industrial Economics 60 (2012); 
Mario Mariniello, “Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Terms: A Challenge for Competition 
Authorities”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 7 (2011); Joshua D. Wright and Aubrey N. 
Stuempfle, “Patent Holdup, Antitrust, and Innovation: Harness or Noose?”, Alabama Law Review 61 (2010); 
Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato, “FRAND Commitment and EC Competition Law: A Reply to Philippe 
Chappatte” European Competition Journal 6 (2010); Damien Geradin, “Pricing Abuses by Essential Patent 
Holders in a Standard-Setting Context: A View from Europe” Antitrust Law Journal 76 (2009); Bruce H 
Kobayashi and Joshua D Wright, “Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An Application 
to Patent Holdup” Journal of Competition Law and Economics 5 (2009); J. Gregory Sidak, ‘Patent Holdup and 
Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard-Setting Organizations’, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 5, 1 
(2009); Gregory J. Sidak “Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent 
Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro”, Minnesota Law Review 92 (2008); Einer R Elhauge, “Do Patent 
Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?” Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics 4 (2008); Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar and Jorge Padilla, “Competing Away Market Power? 
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hand in hand with the significant amount of disputes on this matter, which is giving rise to 
contrasting judicial approaches and leading to the intervention of competition authorities both 
on the EU and US front63. The evolution of the antitrust treatment under EU competition law 
of injunctions for SEPs is illustrated below through a review of decisions that have “set the 
standard” in this previously unchartered area.  
b. Orange Book 
The first guidance in the EU on the permissibility under competition law of seeking 
injunctive relief for an SEP came from the German Federal Court of Justice on 6 May 2009.64 
The suit concerned a permanent injunction sought by Philips against the use of its patents 
concerning CD-R/CD-RW supports.  After finding that those patents were in fact infringed, 
the Court also noted that, since the patents were de facto essential to enter the market (i.e., 
they had become an industry standard without a formal standard-setting process), the patent 
holder seeking injunctive relief would violate competition law if the perspective licensee 
could demonstrate being a “willing licensee”. According to the Court, that qualification 
requires compliance with two conditions:  
1) Making, and remaining bound by, an unconditional offer to conclude a license which 
cannot in good faith be rejected by the patentee- as that would “unfairly impede” the 
defendant or infringe the principle of non-discrimination65. 
2) Behave as if the licence had been granted, i.e. rendering accounts and paying that 
royalty or depositing an equivalent amount in escrow.  
 
As a matter of theory of harm, the judgment evokes a link to the concept of vexatious 
litigaton, more specifically grounded on the principle of good faith enshrined in § 242 of the 
German Civil Code: it found it against that principle to request (injunctive) relief from a court 
when there is an immediate obligation to act against such relief, namely by granting a license 
on FRAND terms. It bears noting that, while this finding could be sufficient to show the 
existence of a baseless claim, a plan to eliminate all competition would still need to be 
demonstrated for the application of this theory of harm under EU competition law. 
Furthermore, what transpires from the specificity of the German context is a concern with 
preserving the patentee’s cashflow, more so than his ability to impose his own licensing 
terms from the start. This approach is consistent with the interpretation of FRAND as a range, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
An Economic Assessment of Ex Ante Auctions in Standard Setting” European Competition Journal 4 (2008); 
Vincenzo Denicolò, Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar and Jorge Padilla, “Revisiting Injunctive Relief: 
Interpreting eBay in High Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders” Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics 4 (2008); John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls and Patent Remedies” Texas Law Review 85 (2007); 
Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato, “Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on 
Patent Hold-up, Royalty-Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND” European Competition Law Journal 3 (2007); 
Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato, “Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on 
Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND” European Competition Journal 3 (2007); 
David J. Teece and Edward F. Sherry, “Standard Setting and Antitrust” Minnesota Law Review 87 (2003). 
63 With regard to the US, see U.S. Federal Trade Commission, “The Evolving IP Marketplace”, supra note 15 ; 
U.S. Department of Justice & Patent and Trademark Office, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-
Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf; Executive Office of the President The United States 
Representative, Disapproval of the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Determination in the Matter of 
Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing 
Devices, and Tablet Computers, Investigation No. 337-TA-794, available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.PDF 
64 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], 6 May 2009, BGHZ 180, 312, NJW-RR 2009, 1047, 
GRUR 2009, 694, WuW 2009,773 (Orange Book Standard). 
65 See the summary of the case made by the CJEU in Huawei v ZTE, supra note 7, para. 31. 
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not a dot; and in doing so, it provides a sensible solution to the problem of abusive recourse 
to injunctions, preserving the patentee’s ability to recover in subsequent proceedings any 
difference between the royalties received and those he would have been entitled to obtain. 
However, the principled nature of the judgment was somehow lost in the markedly pro-
patentee interpretation given by the lower courts: for instance, an appellate court found that 
the qualification of “willing licensee” presupposes giving up the right to challenge the 
validity of the patent66; and a district court ruled that even responding to an SEP holder’s 
offer to license with a full counteroffer, instead of merely adjusting that initial offer, would 
rule out a possible qualification as “willing licensee”, unless that first offer constituted an 
obvious violation of competition law67.  
c. Motorola and Samsung  
The first clarification under EU competition law of the legality of conduct seeking injunctive 
relief for FRAND-encumbered SEPs came on 29 April 2014, when the Commission adopted 
two companion decisions in Motorola68 and Samsung69. According to the Commission’s 
press release on that day, the goal of those decisions was “to prevent SEP holders from using 
SEP-based injunctions in an anticompetitive way, in order to extract licensing conditions that 
may restrict competition and ultimately harm consumers” 70. Note that this statement reveals 
a concern for exploitative harms (“extracting” licensing conditions), rather than for the 
exclusion of competitors or potential competitors. The Commission however also aligns its 
formulation to the realm of possible exclusionary abuses by explaining that when an SEP 
holder has given a FRAND commitment to the SSO and the licensee is willing to take a 
license, seeking injunctive relief can distort licensing negotiations and lead to licensing terms 
with a negative impact on prices and consumer choice (presumably, due to the 
unaffordability of licenses for certain implementers)71. It also points out that implementers 
can always resist injunctions by raising a FRAND defence, as long as they demonstrate to be 
“willing licensees”. What exactly constitutes a willing licensee is not specified, but the 
Commission indicates that a prospective licensee agreeing that a court or a mutually agreed 
arbitrator defines the FRAND terms will be deemed “willing”; and that a licensee will not be 
considered “unwilling” merely for challenging the validity, essentiality, or infringement of 
the SEPs, since “it is in the public interest that potentially invalid patents can be challenged in 
court and that companies, and ultimately consumers, are not obliged to pay for patents that 
are not infringed72”. At first blush, this approach to invalidity challenges strikes as sensible 
and consistent with the Commission’s skeptical treatment of “no-challenge” clauses in 
                                                          
66 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeal] Karlsruhe, 27 February 2012, 6 U 136/11 (Motorola v Apple) 
(FRG) 
67 Motorola v Microsoft, LG Mannheim, 20 May 2012—2 0 240/11, s C.I. 
68 Motorola (Case AT.39985) Commission Decision of 29.04.2014 addressed to Motorola Mobility LLC 
relating to proceedings under Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 EEA Agreement – Motorola – Enforcement of 
GPRS standard essential patents [2014] <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/ 
39985/39985_928_16.pdf>. 
69 Samsung (Case AT.39939) Commission Decision of 29.04.2014 addressed to Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 
Samsung Electronics France, Samsung Electronics GmbH, Samsung Electronics Holding GmbH, Samsung 
Electronics Italia s.p.a. relating to proceedings under Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 EEA Agreement – 
Samsung – Enforcement of UMTS standard essential patents [2014] 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39939/39939_ 
1501_5.pdf> accessed 14 January 2016. 
70 Commission, “Antitrust Decisions on Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) - Motorola Mobility and Samsung 
Electronics - Frequently Asked Questions” MEMO/14/322. 
71 Id. (emphasis added). 
72 Id. 
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licensing agreements73. However, on closer inspection, one cannot help but noticing that the 
way in which the concept is applied in these decisions (creating an absolute bar to waivers of 
the right to validity challenges) tilts the balance in favor of implementers without a clear 
economic justification, as explained below.   
In Motorola, the case arose from the enforcement of patents essential to the GPRS standard. 
Motorola owned a patent (CUDAK patent) that was essential to the GPRS standard, and 
made a FRAND commitment to ETSI. During negotiations, Apple made six different Orange 
Book-offers to Apple, and the Commission found that Apple’s willingness to enter into a 
license agreement could have been concluded from the moment the second offer was made.74 
According to the Commission, the fact that Motorola sought and continued to seek and to 
enforce an injunction against Apple in Germany resulted in a threefold anti-competitive 
harm: a temporary ban on the online sale of Apple’s GPRS-compatible products in Germany; 
the inclusion in the Settlement Agreement of licensing terms disadvantageous to Apple, 
including the termination of the license in case Apple challenged the validity of the SEP in 
question75; and a negative impact on standard-setting, given the legitimate expectation it 
creates on third parties.76  
First, it is important to emphasize the point about the prevention of validity challenges, which 
constituted one of the alleged harms stemming from the threat of injunctive relief. Here, the 
concern of the Commission was that the termination clause, whereby Motorola would be 
entitled to terminate the licensing agreement if the implementer challenged the validity of one 
of its licensed patents, might adversely influence the level of royalties to be paid by Apple: 
by eliminating the possibility that Apple pay zero royalties in case of successful validity 
challenge to a given patent, this clause would raise prices for the implementer and allegedly 
consumers.77 Furthermore, this harm would be propagated to future implementers as they 
cannot benefit from the possibility that Apple invalidates such patents in court.78 This 
reasoning however views the termination clause in surgical isolation from the context of the 
negotiation, where it may constitute an important concession given by the implementer in 
exchange for a lower level of royalties of an entire portfolio of patents, some of which may 
be valid and some of which may be invalid. Removing the possibility for the patent owner to 
secure against the risk of invalidation is likely to lead him to raise the overall royalty level, in 
order to account for that risk, and thus increase the price for implementers, and ultimately, 
consumers.79 As mentioned above, this is not a criticism against the Commission’s goal to 
preserve the right of implementers to challenge patent validity (and thus consider it irrelevant 
for their qualification as “willing licensee”), but rather a reflection about the economic 
consequences of the Commission’s absolutist stance against the waiving of such right as part 
of the negotiation80.  
                                                          
73 See Commission Regulation (EC) 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
to categories of technology transfer agreements [2004] OJ L123/11, article 5(1c); Commission Regulation (EU) 
316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to categories of technology transfer agreements [TTBER], [2014] OJ L93/17, article 5(1b). 
74 Id., paras. 301-307. 
75 Id., paras. 339, 361-363, 375-383. 
76 Id., para. 311. 
77 Id. at para. 338-357. 
78 Id. at para. 375-383. 
79 For a more in-depth elaboration of this point, see Larouche & Zingales, supra note 31, p.582-584. 
80 This position also appears to be inconsistent with the Technology Transfer block exemption regulation, which 
explicitly carves out “any direct or indirect obligation on a party not to challenge the validity of intellectual 
property rights which the other party holds in the Union”, yet preserves “the possibility, in the case of an 
exclusive licence, of providing for termination of the technology transfer agreement in the event that the 
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Second, it is crucial to note the types of harms identified by the Commission: the first one is 
exclusionary, the second exploitative, and the third systemic, introducing “legitimate 
expectation” in the standardization process as a value to be protected by competition law. The 
introduction of this concept is not a mere caprice by the Commission, but represents an 
essential element of the theory of harm which allows it to bring its action in compliance with 
existing case-law, in particular that on refusal to license81. Specifically, the Commission 
relied on the open-ended nature of the “exceptional circumstances” test defined in Microsoft 
to cover a situation featuring the following circumstances: (1) the existence of a standard-
setting process; and (2) an undertaking’s FRAND commitment in relation to its SEPs reading 
on that standard.82 On the latter circumstance, the Commission simply emphasizes the 
expectations generated by commitment-based standardization: by giving a FRAND 
commitment, Motorola indicated that it would grant licenses on FRAND terms; implementers 
of the GPRS standard could therefore reasonably expect that Motorola would indeed grant 
such licenses to all implementers.83 The former circumstance is not discussed at length in the 
decision, but the Commission refers to the ubiquity of the GPRS standard in the 
telecommunications sector and the important role that compatibility and interoperability play 
in fostering follow-on innovation84. Accordingly, on the basis of the asserted effects of 
standard-setting on innovation, the Commission is able to “assume away” the consumer harm 
element implied in Microsoft’s “new product” test, leading to the conclusion that denial of 
access to the standard on FRAND terms constitutes an abuse.  
In its Samsung decision, published on the same day, the Commission accepted commitments 
to address the concerns relating to analogous conduct in relation to another FRAND-
encumbered SEP. Samsung had given a commitment to ETSI to license its UMTS (Universal 
Mobile Telecommunication Service) SEPs on FRAND terms. The Commission investigated 
whether Samsung failed to honor its FRAND obligation, particularly by seeking injunctive 
relief against Apple. It found that the same exceptional circumstances were at stake as in the 
Motorola decision: the UMTS standard-setting process and Samsung’s FRAND 
commitments to license its SEPs.85 As a result, the Commission sent a Statement of 
Objections to Samsung86 in January 2012, to which Samsung replied by offering 
commitments, eventually accepted with some alterations on 29 April 2014. The commitments 
bring some additional clarity as to the type of conduct that the Commission considers 
acceptable, including the timing of negotiation, the role of cross-licenses, of thid party 
determination of FRAND terms, and of validity and essentiality challenges. They key points 
can be summarized as follows:87 
- Injunctive relief and determination of FRAND terms: Samsung will not file a claim 
seeking injunctive relief before any court or tribunal in the EU for infringement of its 
SEPs against any potential licensee who agrees to the Licensing Framework.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
licensee challenges the validity of any of the licensed technology rights”. See TTBER, supra note 73, art 5 (1) 
(b). 
81 Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Magill [1995] ECR I-743;’ Case C418/01 IMS Health v NDC Health 
[2004] ECR I-5039; Microsoft [2004] ECR II-4463. 
82 Motorola, para. 281 
83 Id., para. 294. 
84 Id., para. 286. 
85 Samsung, para. 56. 
86 Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Samsung on Potential Misuse of 
Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents’ (Press Release) IP/12/1448. 
87 Samsung, ‘Case COMP/C-3/39.939 – Samsung Electronics Enforcement of UMTS Standard Essential 
Patents: Commitments Offered to the European Commission’ < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39939/39939_1502_5.pdf> . 
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According to the Framework, Samsung and the potential licensee will enter into a 
negotiating period of 12 months for any SEP disputes. If those negotiations are 
unsuccessful, a third party of choice (a court, unless the parties mutually prefer an 
arbitration panel) shall determine the FRAND terms. Samsung can only seek 
injunctive relief against a potential licensee outside this procedure in very specific 
circumstances, having to do with the licensee’s degree of insolvency, and with its 
failure to comply with the framework or to reciprocate FRAND commitments on their 
own mobile SEPs.88  
- Availability of validity and essentiality challenges: licensees will remain free to 
challenge ‘the validity, essentiality or infringement of the other party’s Mobile SEPs 
outside the context of the Third-Party Determination of FRAND Terms.89  
- Reciprocity: Samsung can condition its FRAND licensing upon reciprocity for SEPs 
in relation to the same standard. While this may be satisfied with either two unilateral 
licenses or apposite cross-licenses, access to the SEP cannot be conditioned upon the 
licensing of non-SEPs or SEPs that are not covered by the reciprocity rules of SSOs.90 
 
In sum, for the first time in Motorola and Samsung the Commission ruled in favor of the 
applicability of the case-law on refusal to license to behavior consisting of seeking an 
injunction for a FRAND-encumbered SEP. Furthermore, in Samsung the Commission also 
carved out a “safe harbor” (i.e., a circumscribed area of non-liability) for implementers: as 
long as they submit to a third party (a court or, per Samsung, an arbitration panel) 
determination of FRAND, they can start implementing the standard without worrying about 
possible patent holders’ injunctions: that conduct would constitute abuse of dominant 
position, and hence could be raised in the course of an infringement proceeding as a 
“FRAND defense”. 
3. The Huawei judgment and its impact on FRAND litigation in the EU 
 
3.1 The Huawei judgment 
 
It took until July 2015 for the CJEU to test the above-described theory of abusive recourse to 
injunctive relief for FRAND-encumbered SEPs.  On 16 July 2015, the CJEU issued its long-
awaited verdict in the case between Huawei and ZTE91, responding to the preliminary 
reference made pursuant to article 267 TFEU by a Düsseldorf District Court in the context of 
a patent infringement suit brought by Huawei. Huawei owned a European patent92, which had 
been declared to ETSI (the European Telecommunications Standards Institute) in March 
2009 as essential to the ‘Long Term Evolution’ standard, and for which Huawei had given a 
FRAND commitment. Between November 2010 and March 2011, Huawei and ZTE 
discussed about the infringement of the patent concerned and about a license on FRAND 
terms relating to that patent. The lack of progress in the negotiations, mainly due the fact 
Huawei sought a royalty amount while ZTE a cross-licensing agreement, did not stop ZTE 
from continuing its production in compliance with the standard. For this reason, Huawei in 
April 2011 brought an action for infringement before the District Court, seeking an injunction 
                                                          
88 Id., clause 2 
89 Id., clause 4 
90 Samsung, para. 102 and 110. 
91 Huawei v ZTE, supra note 7 
92 European patent registered under reference EP 2 090 050 B 1, “Method and apparatus of establishing a 
synchronization signal in a communication system”, granted by the Federal Republic of Germany.  
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that would order ZTE to stop the infringement, rendering the accounts, and recalling the 
infringing products, in addition to a damages award. The Court felt obliged to refer 5 
preliminary questions to the CJEU, seeking clarification on the approach that ought to be 
taken to “determine the point at which the proprietor of an SEP infringes Article 102 TFEU 
as a result of bringing an action for a prohibitory injunction”.93  
The dilemma faced by the Düsseldorf Court was owed to the conflict between the German 
caselaw and the recent position taken by the Commission with regard to injunctions on 
FRAND-encumbered SEPs. Following the Orange Book case, ZTE would have needed to 
make an unconditional offer to Huawei to conclude a licensing agreement, and to behave as 
an actual licensee by paying royalties -both for past and current use of the patent. The court 
however could not conclude that ZTE’s offer was unconditional, because it only related to the 
products giving rise to the infringements, and ZTE did not pay the amount of royalty for past 
use. Therefore, in accordance with Orange Book, the District Court would have been entitled 
to grant the prohibitory injunction sought by Huawei.94 In contrast, according to the European 
Commission in Motorola and Samsung, if the SEP holder has made a FRAND-commitment 
and the infringer is willing to negotiate, a prohibitory injunction is unlawful -and should 
therefore not be granted.95 Thus, following the European Commission’s approach, the District 
Court would have been required to dismiss Huawei’s action for prohibitory injunction, since 
both parties were willing to negotiate. The referring opinion considered that, given the need 
to prevent both implementers and SEP proprietors from exploiting the situation, an SEP 
holder should in principle be able to bring an action for a prohibitory injunction, and such a 
conduct can only constitute abuse in the presence of additional circumstances. In particular, 
the Court criticized using “willingness to negotiate” as a sole additional criterion96, as that 
would give rise to multiple interpretations and an excessive degree of freedom of action for 
the implementer. As a result, the following questions were referred for a preliminary ruling to 
the European Court of Justice: 
(1) Does an SEP holder who made a FRAND commitment to the SSO abuse its dominant 
market position if it brings an action for an injunction against a patent infringer, even though 
the infringer has declared its willingness to negotiate? (following earlier decisions from the 
European Commission) Or is an abuse of dominant market position to be presumed only 
when the infringer has made an acceptable, unconditional offer to conclude a licensing 
agreement to the SEP holder, which the SEP holder cannot refuse without unfairly impeding 
the infringer or breaching the prohibition of discrimination, and the infringer fulfills its 
contractual obligations for past acts of use in anticipation of the license to be granted? 
(following the German Orange Book-judgment) 
(2)  If abuse of a dominant market position is already to be presumed as a consequence of 
infringer’s willingness to negotiate: Does Article 102 TFEU lay down particular qualitative 
and/or timing requirements in relation to the willingness to negotiate? In particular, can 
willingness to negotiate be presumed when the infringer merely stated (orally) in a general 
way that it is prepared to negotiate, or must infringer already have entered into negotiations 
by, for example, submitting specific conditions upon which it is prepared to conclude a 
licensing agreement?  
(3)  If the submission of an acceptable, unconditional offer to conclude a licensing 
agreement is a prerequisite for abuse of a dominant market position: Does Article 102 TFEU 
                                                          
93 Huawei v ZTE, supra note 7, para. 29. 
94 Id., supra note 39, para. 33.  
95 Id., supra note 39,  para. 34. 
96 Id., supra note 39, para. 38. The Court also suggests that in any case, such criterion should be clarified with 
specific qualitative and time requirements. 
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lay down particular qualitative and/or time requirement in relation to the lincensee’s offer? 
Must the offer contain all provisions normally included in licensing agreements in the field of 
technology in question? In particular, may the offer be made subject to the condition that the 
SEP is actually used and/or is shown to be valid? 
(4)      If the fulfillment of the infringer’s obligations arising from that offer is a prerequisite 
for a claim of abuse of a dominant market position: Does Article 102 TFEU require the 
fulfillment of any particular action by the patentee? In particular, is the infringer particularly 
required to render an account for past acts of use and/or to pay royalties? May an obligation 
to pay royalties be discharged, if necessary, by depositing a security? 
(5)    Do the conditions under which the abuse of a dominant position by the proprietor of a 
SEP is to be presumed apply also to an action brought on ground of other claims (for 
rendering of accounts, recall of products, damages) arising from a patent infringement?97 
 
In its decision of July 2015, the CJEU responded by consolidating the four central issues (1 to 
4)98 into one: in what circumstances the bringing of an action for infringement for an SEP by 
a company in a dominant position, which has given a FRAND-commitment to the SSO, is to 
be seen as an abuse contrary to Article 102 TFEU99? The Court addressed this question, and 
most crucially the conflict between Orange Book and Motorola-Samsung, by reference to its 
case-law on the exercise of IPRs: while the right to bring an action for infringement is an 
essential component of IP protection, the exercise of that right can “in exceptional 
circumstances” lead to an abuse of a dominant position.100 In doing so, it validated the two 
exceptional circumstances identified by the Commission in Motorola and Samsung: first, the 
patent is standard-essential, and therefore “indispensable to all competitors who envisage 
manufacturing products that comply with the standard”101. Second, the patent holder has 
given a FRAND-commitment to the SSO. Highlighting the fact that the SEP status is given in 
consideration of the FRAND commitment, the Court reasoned that such status means that the 
patent’s proprietor “can prevent products manufactured by competitors from appearing or 
remaining on the market and, thereby, reserve to itself the manufacture of the products in 
question”102. In these circumstances, given that the FRAND commitment creates “legitimate 
expectations on the part of third parties that the proprietor of the SEP will in fact grant 
licenses on such terms”103, refusal to grant a license “may, in principle, constitute abuse of a 
dominant position”104.  
This answer has been criticized as elusive, as it does not provide more details beyond those 
general circumstances for identifying an abuse105. In contrast, the Court provided details as to 
what conduct does not constitute an abuse. In particular, in order to bring an action for 
prohibitory injunction without falling foul of article 102, an SEP holder must: 
i) Alert the alleged infringer of the infringement, identifying the relevant SEP and 
                                                          
97 Id., supra note 7, para. 39.  
98 Question 5 is answered by the Court in the negative simply on ground that legal proceedings brought with a 
view to obtaining the rendering of accounts or an award of damages “do not have a direct impact on products 
complying with the standard in question manufactured by competitors appearing or remaining on the market”. 
See Huwaei v ZTE, supra note7 , para. 74. 
99 Id., para. 44. 
100 Id., para. 46-47. 
101 Id., para. 49 
102 Id., para. 52 
103 Id., para 53. 
104 Id. 
105 See Nicolas Petit, “Huaweï v. ZTE: Judicial Conservatism at the Patent-Antitrust Intersection”, CPI Antitrust 
Chronicles 10, 2 (2015): 3. 
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specifying the way in which it has been infringed.106  
ii) Present, after the alleged infringer has expressed its willingness to conclude a 
licensing agreement on FRAND terms, a specific, written offer for a license on FRAND 
terms, specifying in particular the amount of royalty and the way in which that royalty is to 
be calculated.107 
To benefit from the protection of competition law under these circumstances, the alleged 
infringer must in turn (i) respond in a serious manner to that offer, “in accordance with 
recognized commercial practices in the field and in good faith”, particularly without delaying 
tactics.108 If he does not accept the offer, he must (ii) submit a written and specific counter-
offer to the SEP holder. Finally, when the alleged infringer already uses the SEP before the 
agreement has been concluded, he must (iii) provide security (for example by providing a 
bank guarantee or by placing the amounts necessary on deposit) from the point when the 
counter-offer is refused, including fo the number of the past acts of use of the SEP.109 The 
following picture (Fig.1) visually explains the prescribed steps (elsewhere called “the Huawei 
choreography”)110 in sequential order: 
 
              SEP HOLDER IMPLEMENTER 
1 Alert infringer about infringement, 
identifying  SEP(s) and explaining 
infringement 
 
 
2  Express willingness to conclude a license 
3 Express willingness to conclude a license 
specifying the amount of royalty and 
explaining its calculation 
 
4  Respond diligently, in accordance with 
commercial practices and in good faith (no 
delaying tactics) 
5  In case of rejection of SEP holder’s offer, 
present specific and written FRAND 
counteroffer 
6  In case of rejection of counteroffer, 
provide appropriate security 
Fig. 1: Choreography set out in Huawei defining a safe harbor for SEP holders and 
implementers 
 
Thus, a novelty of the Huawei judgment is the creation of a safe harbor for SEP holders who 
have given a FRAND commitment: they will not fall foul of article 102 TFEU by seeking an 
injunction to prevent an infringement, as long as they alert the alleged infringer and present a 
specific written offer to which the infringer has not diligently responded. One should not fail 
to see that this approach is diametrically different not only to Orange Book, but also to 
                                                          
106 Huawei v ZTE, supra note 7  para. 62. The reason for the Court to oblige the SEP holder to first notify the 
alleged infringer is the often large number of SEPs included in a standard. An infringer may therefore not 
always be aware of his infringement.  
107 Id., para. 63. 
108 Id., para. 65. 
109 Id., paras. 66-67. 
110 See Larouche & Zingales, supra note 32, p. 20.  
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Motorola and Samsung, where it was upon the alleged infringer to prove that it fulfilled the 
requirements for triggering antitrust liability: respectively, making an unconditional offer to 
the SEP holder and complying with the conditions attached to the offer if it used the patent 
before the offer was accepted; and establishing that the SEP holder’s offer was “un-FRAND” 
based on the royalty determination made by an independent third party. Admittedly, it is not 
clear whether implementers can still benefit from the Samsung safe harbor, since Huawei 
merely states that parties may by common agreement, where no agreement is reached on the 
details of the FRAND terms following the counter-offer by the alleged infringer, request that 
the amount of the royalty be determined by an independent third party, by decision without 
delay: does that mean that no injunction can be sought before that decision? In fairness, it 
seems that an injunction can now still be sought if it is only the implementer who declares its 
willingness to submit to independent third party determination. On the other hand, the ruling 
provides an additional safe harbor for implementers reacting to the SEP holder’s compliant 
behavior, who can avail themselves of the FRAND defense as long as they fulfill the 
indicated set of criteria. All in all, it must be recognized that the Huawei ruling brought 
important clarifications for both SEP holders and implementers, in addition to defining a 
specific theory of harm for the offense of seeking injunctions for FRAND-encumbered SEPs.  
 
3.2 Critical analysis and open issues 
 
While the Huawei judgment significantly improved legal certainty in the application of article 
102 TFEU to SEP disputes, it has also attracted criticism111. In addition to failing to clearly 
delineate the theory of harm, the judgment left a number of practical questions on the scope 
of liability (and relatedly, of the SEP holder’s safe harbor), potentially leading to divergence 
across Member States at the IP/antitrust interface. These two sets of issues are addressed in 
the following subsections. 
a. Duty to license all, or just (potential) competitors? 
The first striking aspect of the Huwaei ruling is that, notwithstanding its adherence to a 
theory of exclusionary abuse, it invokes a generalized principle of legitimate expectations for 
FRAND licenses. At first, the Court refers to the proprietor’s ability “to prevent products 
manufactured by competitors from appearing or remaining on the market and thereby reserve 
to itself the manufacture of the products in question”,112 implying that a certain degree of 
competition between the SEP holder and the implementer is required for the conduct in 
question (seeking injunctive relief) to breach article 102. Yet in the following paragraph of 
the judgment, the Court seems to follow a different theory, reasoning that, because the SEP 
status has been granted only in return for the proprietor’s irrevocable commitment to license 
on FRAND terms113, there are “legitimate expectations that the SEP holder will in fact grant 
those licenses”. This latter theory suggests that everyone (not only competitors) is entitled to 
FRAND licenses, and thus any denial may constitute an abuse114.  
                                                          
111 Larouche & Zingales, supra note 31; Miguel Rato & Mark English, “An Assessment of Injunctions, Patents, 
and Standards Following the Court of Justice’s Huawei/ZTE Ruling” Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice 7, 2 (2016): 103; Petit, supra note 105, p. 4; Sean-Paul Brankin, Salome’ Cisnal de Ugarte, & Lisa 
Kimmel “Huawei/ZTE: Towards a More Demanding Standard of Abuse in Essential Patent Cases”, Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 7, 4 (2016): 2. 
112 Huawei v ZTE, supra note 39, para. 52 
113 The use of “in those circumstances” to tie paragraph 52 with paragraph 53 seems to link the notion of abuse 
to the fact that a patent has been granted SEP status. 
114 Huawei v ZTE, supra note 7, para. 53 
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One plausible interpretation of this apparent inconsistency is that the words “in those 
circumstances” used at the beginning of the second paragraph tie the notion of abuse to the 
theory of leveraging detailed in the preceding paragraph. Accordingly, an abuse would only 
occur where it is sufficiently likely that the SEP holder leverages its patent into a secondary 
market, and thereby prevents the entry or survival of competition on that market115.  In other 
words, SEP holders would incur liability only for exclusionary, and not exploitative refusals 
to license. SEP holders could then legitimately seek injunctions against non-competitors for 
their failure to accept offers on un-FRAND terms, and yet remain free from antitrust liability 
even without fulfilling the conditions of their own Huawei safe harbor116.  
Regrettably, this narrow notion of liability appears inadequate to address the potentially 
significant holdup concerns arising with the deploment of the Internet of Things, where SEP 
licenses will be required to connect a wide range of “objects”, such as cars, fridges, and 
various other sorts of physical objects embodying sensors117. In that scenario, where wireless 
chips and any implicated patents constitute a small feature of the entire product, bearing only 
a remote connection to the market for the downstream product in question, could Huawei 
really be interpreted in such a way that SEP holders are free to seek injunctions against the 
producers of those standard-compliant technologies? Taking a narrow interpretation leaves us 
with a significant gap of protection in one of the most promising areas of technological 
development. 
The narrow interpretation of liability also appears to clash with the Commission’s view. 
Shortly after Huawei, a public speech of Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager 
offered support for a generalized concept of legitimate expectations, indicating that the holder 
of a SEP “must commit in advance to license it to all third parties on fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory terms”.118 The Commissioner explained the rationale of this obligation, 
which is to guarantee that standards “are open to all”119, in line with the existing EU approach 
to standardization120. That said, it should also be acknowledged that it is not clear whether the 
word “must” implicitly referred the an antitrust duty, or simply restated the content of 
contractual FRAND obligations. Furthermore, the Commissioner did not explicitate that the 
failure to grant a FRAND license to either a competitor or (even) a non-competitor entails a 
violation of article 102 TFEU. As a result, this argument cannot be given much weight. 
It is submitted that this confusing state of affairs is due to the CJEU’s acritical acceptance of 
the Commission’s position in Motorola, which, as mentioned, already revealed a 
contradiction between exploitative and exclusionary harm. Instead of addressing that 
contradiction by expanding the scope of antitrust liability through the definition of a cogent 
theory of exploitative abuse, the court simply endorsed the aforementioned view of 
“undermining trust in the standardization process” as harm to consumers, which offers a 
shortcut to the more complex and sensitive exercise of recognizing the existence of holdup. 
                                                          
115 See in this sense Petit, supra 105, p. 4. This would also explain the words “may, in principle” that qualify the 
definition of such conduct as abusive. 
116  Huawei v ZTE, supra note 7, para. 61-69 
117 The heightened risk of patent holdup in the context of the Internet of Things was specifically discussed in 
Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, “Patent Assertions: Are We Any Closer to Aligning Reward to 
Contribution?”, in Innovation Policy and The Economy, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 2016) , 89. 
118 Speech of Commissioner Vestager, “Intellectual Property and Competition”, 11 September 2015, 19th IBA 
Conference, Florence, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-
2019/vestager/announcements/intellectual-property-and-competition_en> (emphasis added). 
119 Id. 
120 See Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 15, paras. 268, 294; Decision of 15 December 1986, X/Open Group 
[1986] OJ L 35/36. 
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As a result, the most plausible interpretation of the ruling is one that reconciles the two 
approaches by broadening the traditional notion of “competitor” to encompass undertakings 
in all those markets in which an SEP constitutes an essential input. In other words, an SEP 
holder is a potential competitor in all those markets, because he can in principle (violating 
FRAND commitments) reserve to itself (and none other) the provision of the products and 
services of its implementers. This furthers the well established EU policy to promote access 
to standards and use standardization as a lever for follow-on innovation121.  
Such interpretation opens up new scenarios, whereby a FRAND defense is available to any 
user of the patent, including distributors or manufacturers using the teaching of the patent at 
different levels of the production chain. While the doctrine of patent exhaustion prevents SEP 
holders from extracting two licenses for the same patent, it does not impose limits on their 
ability to exercise their rights at any level of the production chain, even if the standard 
practice in the industry has been to require a license from device manufacturers (and not frmo 
distributors of those devices). This matter was particularly relevant in the context of the 
injunction obtained by SEP holder Saint Lawrence before the Regional Court of Mannheim 
in November 2015 against Deutsche Telekom, a network operator selling standard-compliant 
mobile devices122. The patent concerned read on the AMR-WB standard for wideband audio 
coding used in HD-Voice transmission, and was subject to a FRAND commitment with 
ETSI. In the infringement proceeding brought by Saint Lawrence, Deutsche Telekom raised 
an antitrust FRAND defense indicating that mobile manufacturer HTC had specifically 
offered to take a license for the patent asserted, which would then be sublicensed to its 
distributor Deutsche Telekom. However, the Court rejected this defense following a rigid 
interpretation of Huawei, i.e. noting that that the offer had been made to the defendant, while 
the counter-offer was submitted by a third party: it was thus Deutsche Telekom’s 
responsibility to enter into a licensing agreement after being notified of the infringment and 
receiving a FRAND offer. 
Although the Saint Lawrence judgment predates the Huwaei decision, it strikes as a logical 
extension of the “legitimate expectation” theory advanced by the Court: if all third parties are 
entitled to obtain a license on FRAND terms, they are also all expected to do so, if asked, in 
relation to any product they use, sale or make implementing the standard. The Mannheim 
Court explained that a patent holder who has given a FRAND commitment retains a valid 
legal interest in injunctive relief against a distributor123, as he would otherwise have to face 
the continuous risk that the latter distributes patent-infringing mobile phones received from 
manufacturers who do not satisfy the requirements for a FRAND defense. It also noted that 
the objective of a FRAND defense is not to guarantee the existence of certain distribution 
models for SEP holders (such as a manufacturer-focused licensing programme), but rather to 
                                                          
121 Id.. See also supra, section 1. For a recent example, see  Communication “ICT Standardisation Priorities for 
the Digital Single Market” (COM(2016)176 of 19.4.2016); and Communication “Digitising European Industry. 
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122 Saint Lawrence Communications v. Deutsche Telekom, Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Mannheim 27 
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123 Although the Court did not address the issue, this interpretation appears to be required also by article 11 of 
the IP Enforcement Directive, which imposes Member States to “ensure that rightholders are in a position to 
apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual 
property right”. Thus, it is not surprising that another attempt to sue distributors for commercialization of SEP-
infringing products was successful also in Italy: see Sisvel v ZTE, Tribunale di Torino [Court of Turin]18 
January 2016, R.G. 30308/2015. 
25 
 
prevent the SEP holder from exploiting the dependence of the market on its SEP to prevent 
other companies from entering it.124  
That injunction was appealed to the Karlsruhe Appellate Court, who disagreed with the ruling 
and suspended its enforcement pending a decision on the merits125. It reasoned that if the 
theory advanced by the Mannheim Court were to be followed, an SEP holder could 
strategically prohibit sub-licenses with some distributors in its agreements with device 
manufacturers, so as to be able to conclude its own license with those distributors126. In the 
eyes of the Court, the possibility to sue distributors in these circumstances gives SEP holders 
an additional bargaining chip that would affect licensing negotiations, leading manufacturers 
to accept conditions that they would not otherwise agree to. Furthermore, to the extent that an 
SEP holder does so departing from his existing licensing practices, this could be considered 
to violate the FRAND commitment (and in particular its “ND” component). Once again, the 
concern articulated by the Appelate Court is one of exploitation, but it becomes an 
exclusionary theory of harm when channeled through the requirements set up by Huawei.  
A similar outcome to the Regional Court of Mannheim’s was reached by the Regional Court 
of Düsseldorf, in a parallel case brought by Saint Lawrence against device distributor 
Vodafone127. Here, the Court ruled again allowed the SEP holder to seek an injunction 
against a distributor, as opposed to the manufacturer of the infringing product, but also 
accepted that a FRAND defense may be raised by the distributor with reference to dealings at 
another level of the chain128. What is striking about this case is that it was brought by  by 
Saint Lawrence, a patent assertion entity (“PAE”) who has in principle no interest in 
leveraging its position into secondary markets, and yet the theory of harm underlying the 
FRAND defense was framed as one of exclusion. This strand of cases thus well illustrates the 
importance of a clarification on the scope of the antitrust duty to license on FRAND terms, 
and of the correlative right to obtain a license on such terms, to prevent inconsistencies in the 
implementation of the Huawei principles. Arguably, the only possible clarification (as 
opposed to a repeal) of Huawei is a recognition that the theory of harm is an exclusionary 
one, but liability only attaches if the SEP holder has or is able to aquire a market position 
such that by refusing to license it excludes its competitors. In other words, it is not a “per se” 
theory of abuse, but rather a “rule of reason” inquiry that requires the consideration of the 
structure and dynamics of competition in the affected market.  
In the absence of such clarification, national courts are likely to extend Huawei liability to 
scenarios of injunctions sought for mere disagreements on royalties, even where a proper 
Huawei procedure has been followed by the SEP holder129. A recent example is the UK High 
Court’s ruling in Unwired Planet v Huawei130. In this case, the Court explicitly addresses 
claims of excessive and discriminatory pricing, arising in the context of the injunction sought 
by Unwired against Huawei for the licensing of the three telecommunication SEPs it had 
acquired from Ericsson. Starting from the premise that there can only be one “true” FRAND 
                                                          
124Nadine Herrmann and Catherine Manley, “Germany: IP and Antitrust”, Global Competition Review 
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/72/sections/249/chapters/2922/germany-ip-antitrust/  
125 Saint Lawrence Communications v Deutsche Telekom, OLG Karlsruhe 23 April 2015, 6 U 44/15. 
126 Herrmann & Manley, supra note 104. 
127 Saint Lawrence v. Vodafone & HTC, LG Düsseldorf 31 March 2016, 4a O 126/14 
128 Id. , paras. 398-403. 
129 The criticism expressed here is not just about attaching liability to such circumstances, but more pointedly 
about the risk that national courts expand (or in the opposite scenario, restrict) the reach of Huawei, potentially 
undermining the harmonization that the ruling was supposed to have brought and significantly increasing the 
room for forum shopping. See infra, section 4.  
130 Unwired Planet v Huawei, EWHC5 April 2017, HP-2014-000005,  
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rate that has been agreed upon as part of the FRAND commitment, the Court proceeded to 
examine Unwired’s licensing offers on the basis of an identified FRAND benchmark, finding 
that the rates offered for 4G were about three times higher, while those offered for 2G/3G 
varied between one and a half and six times the benchmark rate131. The Court examined the 
excessive pricing allegations under a demanding standard, requiring for a violation of article 
102 (a) that rates be “so far above FRAND as to act to disrupt or prejudice the negotiations 
themselves”132. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that this is a high standard for excessive 
pricing claims, but justified by the risk that otherwise, implementers would simply “throw up 
their hands and refuse to negotiate at all”133. In that same paragraph however, judge Birss 
also rushed to reconcile this finding with Huawei v. ZTE, clarifying that the abuse would not 
be the demand of a non-FRAND rate, but rather to bring injunctive patent infringement 
proceedings prematurely: those above-FRAND rates could not have in any way “prejudiced” 
the negotiations when it comes to a large and sophisticated organization like Huawei, used to 
negotiating telecommunications licences and not unfamiliar with patent litigation134.  
In determining the FRAND benchmark, Judge Birss also considered the possible application 
of competition law to the imposition of discriminatory rates135. In particular, he examined 
whether the non-discriminatory aspect of FRAND is coextensive with the competition law 
obligation, for the purpose of determining its scope: does it merely require the treatment of all 
parties in line with the FRAND benchmark? Or does it also include a “hard-edged” 
component which entitles to the same treatment similarly situated competitors (in this case, 
Huawei and Samsung)?136  Relying upon expert testimony, he ultimately dismissed the latter, 
broader interpretation137 and noted that even if it were to be accepted, the hard-edged 
component could only be invoked where a “distortion of competition” in the sense of article 
102 © can be identified138. In doing so, he rejected the applicability of a presumption of 
competitive disadvantage derived from the CJEU’s judgment in British Airways139, on ground 
that the presumption in that case rested on the specific characteristics of the market for travel 
agents in the United Kingdom140. Thus, while the judgment stands for the proposition that a 
FRAND obligation arising from commitment to an SSO (or more specifically, to ETSI) does 
not go beyond competition law, and does not prevent an SEP holder from granting some of 
its licensees a more favorable treatment, it also does not rule out a stricter interpretation of 
FRAND in specific circumstances-which could pave the road for other courts to address 
exploitative discrimination. 
b. Requirements for SEP holders and implementers 
Other important questions were left open by Huawei v ZTE, both with regard to the 
conditions that its safe harbor imposes on the patent holder, and on the requirements that an 
implementer must satisfy in order to invoke article 102 in relation to an injunction sought for  
                                                          
131 Id., at para. 773 
132 Id., at para. 765 
133 Id.  
134 Id., at para. 774 
135 Id., at para. 484 
136 Id., para. 488 
137 Id., para. 501 
138 Id., para. 503 
139 Case C-95/04 P, British Airways plc v Commission of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 
140 In particular, the fact that the fidelity-inducing rebates could lead to an exponential changes in the revenues 
of travel agents, who competed intensively, and that that ability to compete depended on two factors, namely 
'their ability to provide seats on flights suited to travellers' wishes, at a reasonable cost' and, secondly, their 
individual financial resources. Id., paras. 146 and 147.  
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a FRAND-encumbered SEP (in other words, the conditions of the implementer’s safe 
harbor). 
With regard to the SEP holder’s conduct, the very first open issue is the amount of 
information that should be given to the implementer. Post-Huawei case-law suggested that  
the obligation to provide notice of the infringment can be fulfilled by submitting claim charts 
of the patents infringed141, and subsequently clarified that even a sample of claim charts 
would be sufficient for patent portfolios; however, there is divergence on the interpretation of 
what constitutes a sufficient sample142. Furthermore, more recent judgments both in 
Germany143 and in the Netherlands144 have been rather demanding with regard to the 
information included in an offer to license, requiring the SEP holder (specifically, Philips) to 
explain the calculation of the royalty rate. However, it should be noted that the potential 
significance of these discrepancies may be mitigated by the fact that certain courts admit the  
provision of the relevant information after the commencedment of legal proceedings, which 
has so far happened in two cases145. While in the first case this leniency towards the SEP 
holder might have been due to the transitional nature of the case (i.e., although the ruling was 
issued after the Huawei judgment, the facts occurred prior to it)146, in the second and more 
recent case the UK High Court made a deliberate choice to view the Huawei criteria as 
illustrative, and therefore not strictly determinative of the amount of information to be 
provided at each step. In the words of the Court,  the Huawei procedure did not seek to “set 
out a series of rigid predefined rules, […] deviation from which is always abusive, all 
regardless of the circumstances”147. This type of flexibility is likely to increase divergences in 
national and regional interpretation of Huawei, on this as well as other procedural elements 
identified in the safe harbors.  
 
A second aspect of uncertainty on the implementation of Huawei for SEP holders concerns 
whether it is acceptable to offer licenses to portfolios, and the connected question of whether 
a worldwide license can be offered, in particular in those situations where an implementer 
only requires license to an SEP and in a limited geographic area. Both questions were central 
in the UK dispute between Unwired Planet, a PAE who acquired 5 different SEPs from 
Ericsson, and Huawei. While Unwired offered a license to its worldwide portfolio of SEPs 
for 2G, 3G and 4G standards, defendant Huawei expressed an interest to take a license only 
for particular SEPs which were both valid and infringed, and only in relation to particular 
territories. In a preliminary ruling denying a motion for summary judgment148, Judge Birss 
reiterated the principles he laid out the previous year in Vringo v ZTE149, a case that was 
eventually settled150. Those principles go in the same direction: on the one hand, they hold 
that any worldwide offer that is deemed FRAND need not be the only possible FRAND offer, 
                                                          
141 Saint Lawrence v Vodafone & HTC, supra note 127. 
142 See Georg Nolte & Lev Rosenblum, “Injunctions in SEP cases in Europe” (March 10, 2017). Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2984193, 11 (referring to ruling by OLG Düsseldorf holding that three claim 
charts for a portfolio of 400 patents is insufficient) and 15 (referring to ruling by LG Mannheim holding that six 
claim charts for the portfolio was sufficient).  
143 Philips v Archos, LG Mannheim 1 July 2016, 7 O 209/15 
144 Archos v Philips, Rechtbank  [District Court] Den Haag, 8 February 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025. 
145 St. Lawrence v. Vodafone, supra note 127. Unwired Planet v. Huawei, supra note 41 
146 This is the case of St. Lawrence v. Vodafone. In fact, for a diametrically opposite interpretation, see Philips v. 
Archos (a non-transitional case), supra note 143. 
147 Unwired Planet, supra note 41, para. 741. 
148 Unwired Planet v Huawei et al. [2015] EWHC 1029 (Pat). 
149 Vringo Infrastructure Inc. v ZTE [2015] EWHC 214 (Pat). 
150  Jack Ellis, “Vringo's $21.5 million global settlement with ZTE reflects the IP market's new realities”, IAM (8 
December 2015) http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=16c03b05-cd13-46c3-9e55-eb0a57c99a57. 
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which implies that a licensee is free to submit a counteroffer limited to certain territories, as 
long as the terms of the counteroffer are also FRAND151. On the other hand, the principles 
recognize that the fact that a worldwide offer is FRAND does not necessarily mean that an 
implementer using a patent in one jurisdiction would be ‘forced to take a global portfolio 
licence in order to stave off a national injunction on that one patent’152. As a result, Judge 
Birss does not find problematic in principle when SEP holders demand licenses broader than 
the ones strictly required by the activities of the relevant implementer, as long as they do not 
“insist on them”153. In other words, asking for a broader license may be a legitimate attempt 
to expand the scope of the agreement as part of the regular course of negotiations, but it may 
be anticompetitive if it constitutes a condition for the grant of the required license154. 
A different approach to the geographical scope of licensing offers was taken by the Regional 
Court of Mannheim in Saint Lawrence155, by holding that a worldwide portfolio license is 
admissible if submitted in “good faith” and “in accordance with commercial practice”. 
However, the Court did not specify whether the SEP holder was entitled to consider the 
implementer an “unwilling licensee” when the latter made a counteroffer limited to one or 
more specific territories. Would that counteroffer trigger the obligation to make a more 
limited FRAND offer, as judge Birss’ “insistence” criterion suggest, in order for the SEP 
holder to seek an injunction without falling foul of article 102 TFEU? This is another issue on 
which we are likely to see different approaches at the national level. This uncertainty is a 
consequence of the highly context-dependent nature of the implementation of the Huwaei 
principles. The referring Court in Huawei had in fact asked the CJEU to clarify inter alia 
whether article 102 TFEU lays down any particular qualitative and/or timing requirements in 
relation to the willingness to negotiate. However, by referring to general concepts such as 
“delaying tecniques”, “ good faith” and “in accordance with commercial practice”, the CJEU 
left the door wide open for diverging interpretations. 
On the implementer’s side, the Huawei judgment left unclear whether the failure to diligently 
respond to an invitation to license an SEP constitutes a bar to a FRAND defense even where 
the SEP holder has not fulfilled himself the safe harbor requirements. A Düsseldorf district 
Court recently ruled in the affirmative, although limiting the applicability of this principle 
only to cases where it is clear that the implementer has not responded to an invitation to 
license in good faith156. In this case, SEP holder Sisvel sought a prohibitory injunction against 
device manufacturer Qingdao Haier Group and its parent company Haier for the alleged 
infringement of some of its over 350 SEPs, that had been declared essential for GSM, GPRS, 
UMTS and LTE standards and subject to an ETSI commitment.  Haier’s evident failure in 
this case was to have provided security only at the oral hearing on 29 September 2015, 
despite having already rejected multiple offers and made counteroffers. In comparison to the 
                                                          
151 Vringo Infrastructure Inc. v ZTE, supra note 149, paras. 107-109. Judge Birss also mentioned practical 
considerations deriving from common licensing practice: first, there may be situations where a worldwide 
license results cheaper than multiple single-licenses for the various territories in which a licensee uses a patent. 
Second, there is an important distinction between the scope of licensed rights and the royalty-bearing event, 
such that the alleged inconsistency of requests for worldwide license and the manufacturing taking place only in 
specific countries would be a false dichotomy. See Unwired, supra note 41, para. 52 
152 Vringo, supra note 149, para. 108. 
153 Unwired Planet, supra note 41, para. 790. In this particular case, the willingness of Unwired Planet to 
achieve an alternative licensing arrangement was explicitly indicated in the licensing offer. See Id., para. 788. 
154 Unwired Planet, supra note 41, para. 28,  citing Windsurfing International v Commission, Case 193/83 
[1986] ECR-0611. 
155 Saint Lawrence Communications v. Deutsche Telekom, supra note 125. 
156 See Sisvel Wireless Patent Portfolio v. Qingdao Haier Group, 4a O 93/14 and 4a O 144/14 (Landgericht 
Düsseldorf Nov. 3, 2015). 
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procedure described in Huawei, the Court effectively reversed the order of the analytical 
process157: instead of reviewing the ‘FRAND’-ness of the SEP holder’s offer, it first focused 
on the defendant’s counteroffer. It indicated that an implementer’s obligation to make a 
specific FRAND counteroffer arises as soon as the SEP holder makes any license offer that 
specifies the royalty to be paid and the way in which the royalty is calculated158. A similar 
approach was adopted more recently by LG Mannheim in NTT DoCoMo v. HTC159 and 
Pioneer160. 
Following this interpretation, whether the SEP holder’s offer ‘is substantively FRAND’ only 
matters insofar as it has been established both that the licensee’s behavior is in accordance 
with good faith and commercial practices, and that his offer is not obviously un-FRAND. 
This turns the tables significantly in favor of the SEP holder, which can be a problematic 
default setting for the determination of FRAND: an alleged infringer typically does not have 
perfect information about the value of an infringed patent, such that he can make an adequate 
FRAND counter-offer. For this reason, the recent judgment rendered by the Düsseldorf 
appellate court overturning the lower court’s opinion and remanding for a proper Huawei 
assessment161is to be welcomed as a readjustment of the balance between the parties’ 
obligations. The appellate court explained that the obligations listed in the Huawei 
choreography are “sequential”, so that any implementer’s duty (in this case, the provision of 
appropriate security) is triggered by the fulfillment of the corresponding patentee’s 
obligations. This interpretation is in line with the conclusions reached by a number of other 
courts, including the OLG Karlsruhe in Sony v. Acer162 and Pioneer163 and  the OLG 
Düsseldorf in Sisvel v Haier 164.   
One might see this line of cases as conflicting with the judgments handed down by the 
Mannheim district court in Saint Lawrence v Deutsche Telekom and in NTT DoCoMo v 
HTC165. In Saint Lawrence, the court discarded out of hand a FRAND defense without even 
assessing the FRAND-ness of patentee’s offer, on the ground that the submitted counter-offer 
was insufficiently specific166. In NTT DoCoMo, the same court adopted a similar approach 
dismissing a FRAND defense for a number of reasons, including the absence of an obvious 
non-FRAND offer and the implementer’s failure to provide security and delay (18 months) in 
submitting the counteroffer167. In fact, these judgments can be reconciled by drawing a 
                                                          
157 Once again, it should be noted that this was a transitional case, therefore there was strictly speaking no 
obligation to follow Huawei. 
158 See Rufus Pichler and Holger Kastler “First German Decisions Applying the CJEU’s Huawei v. ZTE 
Framework on Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents”, Morrison and Forester Client Alert (18 February 
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159 NTT DoCoMo v. HTC Germany, LG Mannheim 29 January 2016, 7 O 66/15. 
160 Pioneer v. Acer, 8 January 2016, 7 O 96/14. 
161Sisvel Wireless Patent Portfolio v. Qingdao Haier Group, OLG Düsseldorf 13 January 2016, 15 U 65/15. 
162 Sony v Acer, OLG Karlsruhe 8 September 2016, 6U 58/16. 
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165 NTT DoCoMo v. HTC Germany, supra note 159. 
166 In particular, because it remanded for the royalty amount to a third party determination. Saint Lawrence 
Communications GmbH v. Deutsche Telekom, supra note 125, para. 353. 
167167 As already mentioned with regard to the SEP holder’s duties, timing remains a material issue for 
interpretation. With regard to the counteroffer, in addition to this ruling, it should be noted that a Düsseldorf 
District Court found five months to be also too long (Saint Lawrence v Vodafone and HTC, supra note 127). 
German courts have also been strict with regard to the timing of the expression of willingness to take a license: a 
span of five months (Saint Lawrence v Vodafone and HTC, supra note 127) and even more than three months 
(Saint Lawrence v Deutsche Telekom and HTC, supra note 125) after gaining knowledge of the alleged 
infringement has been considered excessive. 
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distinction between substantive and procedural FRAND obligations, the former referring to 
the accuracy of the calculation of the royalty amount, and the latter to the fulfillment of 
various requirements imposed on each party for enjoyment of their safe harbor168. The 
difference in outcome between these two strands of cases suggests that substantive FRAND-
ness analysis only constitutes the last step in the chain of obligations defined in the Huawei 
procedure.  
However, whether this view will be followed by other courts throughout Europe remains to 
be seen. What is apparent is that national courts are left with a significant margin of 
flexibility in defining the concrete operation of  the Huawei criteria, including (and perhaps 
most troublingly) when it comes to establishing the fulfillment of the requirements of the 
FRAND offer which triggers the Huawei choreography. Whether it is the SEP holder who 
bears the burden of proving FRANDness or the implementer who needs to show 
unFRANDness and under what standard (for example, the “non-manifest” threshold of 
unFRANDness used to evaluate the implementer’s conduct by certain German court) make a 
significant difference in the significance and application of the safe harbors devised by the 
CJEU. As this survey of post-Huawei cases has shown, even once the choreography is 
triggered, a variety of gaps remain for courts to fill, such as the amount of information that an 
SEP holder must provide in its notice of infringment, the validity and sufficiency of broad 
(such as portfolio and worlwide) licensing offers and more limited licensing counteroffers, 
the timing of counteroffers and the expression of willingness to license. To that, one should 
add the risks of divergence that lie outside the safe harbors, namely the type of conduct 
giving rise to liability and the possibility for an SEP holder to escape such liability even 
without following the exact steps of the Huawei choreography. In addition to potentially 
undermining the uniformity that the Huawei judgment was supposed to bring, each of these 
elements can be a significant driver of litigation to one or more particular fora of jurisdiction, 
encouraging strategic use of legal system to achieve the most profitable outcome.  The 
following section demonstrates that the rules of private international law hardly provide a 
backstop to this behavior.  
  
                                                          
168 See in this sense NTT DoCoMo v HTC Germany, supra note 159, holding that an SEP holder ‘s offer is 
sufficient for triggering the implementer’s obligation as long as it is not evidently in breach of FRAND 
requirements. 
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4. Forum shopping for SEP injunctions in the EU: private international law 
considerations 
 
To summarize the argument made so far: the variety of issues left open by Huawei creates the 
twofold risk of inconsistent treatment of SEP disputes across EU and of concentration of 
litigation in the most patent-favorable fora. This arguably exacerbates an existing feature of 
the patent system in EU: as discussed in paragraph 2.1, while a certain level of harmonization 
on IP enforcement across the EU was obtained through the IP Enforcement Directive, 
significant disparities remain at the national level. Unfortunately, the intrinsically related 
problem of coordination in a system of differentiated national procedures is only partly 
addressed by the Brussels I Regulation169, which created a uniform system of rules on 
jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial cases. Nor 
has the situation significantly improved under the Brussels Recast Regulation,170 which 
replaced Brussels I in 2015.  The present section provides a summary of the salient provisions 
in those two Regulations, illustrating the room for manouver left under the current system for 
the so called “forum shopping”, i.e the ability of a litigant initiating legal proceedings to 
select the forum of litigation on strategic grounds: for example, the expected duration of 
proceedings, the available remedies or the amount of damages that are likely to be recovered 
in that country171.  
4.1 General and special rules of jurisdiction 
 
As a general principle, the common rules of private international law in EU provide that 
jurisdiction is established on the basis of the defendant’s domicile.172 In addition, specific 
rules for ‘special jurisdiction’ establish alternative fora based on the type of dispute which is 
brought before a court (for example, depending on whether it is a contractual matter173 or one 
of tort, delict or quasi-delict174) or on the existence of multiple correlated actions (for 
example, when there are multiple defendants and the claims against them are so closely 
connected that it is expedient to deal with them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable 
judgments)175. The criteria identified by these alternative fora are more flexible, facilitating 
patent holders’ choice between different venues: for example, the identity of the legal actions 
brought against multiple defendants is not an indispensable requirement for the consolidation 
                                                          
169 Council Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1 (Brussels I Regulation). 
170 Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2012] OJ 
L351/1 (Recast Regulation). 
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for the patentee's technology or products. See Stuart J.H. Graham & Nicolas Van Zeebroeck, “Comparing Patent 
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article 24 Brussels I Regulation, article 35 Recast Regulation. 
173 Article 5(1) Brussels I Regulation, article 7(1) Recast Regulation. 
174 Article 5(3) Brussels I Regulation, article 7(2) Recast Regulation. 
175 See article 6(1) Brussels I Regulation, article 8(1) Recast Regulation. 
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of the respective claims176. Similarly, the existence of differences in the spectrum of rights 
conferred by the respective national laws does not preclude the possibility that separate 
proceedings would give rise to irreconcilable judgments177, so long as those defendants are 
accused of having committed the same infringements with regard to the same products in the 
same Member States178. The ultimate requirement, in order for decisions to be regarded as 
potentially contradictory so as to warrant rejoinder, is that of possible divergence concerning 
the outcome, and in the context of the same situation of law and fact.179 As the CJEU 
clarified more recently in the context of multinational cartel infringments, there is a 
sufficiently close connection where the unlawfulness of the defeandant’s conduct is 
determined by EU law180. It follows that it is technically possible for an SEP holder to file an 
action for infringement in one country and subsequently obtain rejoinder of related 
proceedings initiated in other countries (including any counterclaim of abuse of dominance 
for having sought an injunction for the same SEP), as long as there is no material difference 
between the laws of the countries in question.  
An additional flexibility exists with regard to the special forum for tort, delict or quasi-delict, 
which is established on the basis of the place ‘where the harmful event occurred or may 
occur’181: first, the CJEU clarified in its early jurisprudence that the requirements of this 
provision (rectius, the equivalent provision in the Brussels Convention)182 can be fulfilled 
basing jurisdiction either on the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred or 
the place where the damage actually occurred.183 Second, the Brussels I Regulation added the 
wording ‘or may occur’ – suggesting that even the mere likelihood of infringement is 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction. At the same time, the Court specified that such formulation 
cannot encompass just any country where adverse consequences could be felt of an event 
which has already caused damage elsewhere, as it requires the existence of a particularly 
close connecting factor between the dispute and courts other than those of the State of the 
defendant's domicile.184 In the context of patent law, commentators understood this to imply 
that the scope of jurisdiction grounded on this provision can extend to foreign activities only 
if the infringing product was manufactured in the forum, and will be limited to domestic 
activities if it is based merely on the circulation of the damaging product within the territory 
of the State185.  
This is no insignificant distinction: as a practical matter, the use of the jurisdictional hook of 
art 5 (3) of Brussels I (7 (3) Recast) is intrinsically connected to the geographical scope of the 
remedies that can be granted by the courts in question. However, EU law is still somewhat in 
motion concerning this matter, as illustrated by the recent opinion of Advocate General Boek 
in Svensk Handel186. There, the Advocate General recommended an abandonment of the so 
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185 Perkins & Mills, supra note 171. 
186 Case C‑ 194/16, Bolagsupplysningen OÜ Ingrid Ilsjan v Svensk Handel AB, Request for Preliminary Ruling, 
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called “mosaic approach” to jurisdiction developed in Shevill187, whereby courts exercising 
jurisdiction on the basis of article 5 (3) for distribution of an infringing product are only 
competent in relation to injuries suffered domestically. To be sure, much of the Advocate 
General’s opinion discusses the specifics of these two cases, in particular concerning 
reputational damage via printed media (in Shevill) and via the Internet (in Svensk Handel); it 
noted that the Internet has “democratized publication” and thus rendered obsolete the need 
for a stronger protection for individuals vis a vis publishers for infringement of their 
personality rights188, which was the justification in eDate189 for creating a special and full 
head of jurisdiction grounded upon the plaitiff’s “centre of interest”, and alternative to the 
“mosaic jurisdiction” based on the online distribution or accessibility of the infringing 
content. However, the Advocate General’s argument for extending this basis for jurisdiction 
to “Internet-related tortious claims” could apply mutatis mutandis in intellectual property 
cases190: first, he submitted that the “centre of interests” test is in line with the “high 
predictability of jurisdictional rules” that the Recast Regulation pursues, as opposed to the 
existing test which involves a contextual assessment of the existence of a “close connecting 
link” between the subject matter of the measures sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the 
court. Secondly, he argued that granting merely “mosaic jurisdiction” for Internet-related 
torts means granting the forum to a large number of jurisdictions simultaneously191, which 
not only is difficult to reconcile with the objective of predictability of jurisdictional rules and 
sound administration of justice, but also leads to a fragmentation of claims that doesn’t help 
either party192. While it is hard to tell whether the CJEU will follow this thought-provoking 
opinion, one could imagine the same arguments being advanced with regard to the use of 
SEPs, particularly in relation to globally commercialized products reading on the standard, in 
light of the “democratization” of technology that standardization has generated, the costs of 
unpredictability and the inconvenience caused to both parties by the fragmentation of legal 
proceedings. All in all, it is not inconceivable that the eDate approach might soon extend to 
intellectual property cases, which would significantly increase the attractiveness of the 
special forum for torts for its ability to offer “full” (as opposed to “mosaic”) jurisdiction on 
EU-wide infringments.  
Finally, and even if the CJEU were to reject Advocate General Boek’s recommendation to 
expand the “centre of interest” approach, a further opportunity for strategic litigation is 
offered by the evolving role of accessibility of a product on the Internet as a basis for tort 
jurisdiction193. This area has been recently reformed by a case originated from a preliminary 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Opinion of Advocate General Boek, 13 July 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:554. 
187 Case C-68/93, Shevill and Others [EU:C:1995:61]. 
188  Paras. 62 and 67. 
189 Joined cases C‑ 509/09 and C‑ 161/10, eDate Advertising and Others [EU:C:2011:685]. 
190 This would imply an overruling of the current distinction between personality and intellectual property cases, 
with the latter type of cases requiring jurisdiction limited to the territory of the Member State of registration. See 
Case C 523/10 Wintersteiger [2012] ECR. However, this overruling is not so far fetched, if one thinks that the 
same approach has been adopted in multijurisdictional competition cases: see Case C-352/13, Cartel Damage 
Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA v. Akzo Nobel NV, Solvay SA/NV, Kemira Oyj, FMC Foret SA, 
EU:C:2015:335, para. 54.  
191 Id., para. 78. 
192 Id., paras 79, 80 and 88. 
193 See, for instance, in the copyright field Peter Pinckney v KDG Mediatech AG, Case C-170/12, CJEU, 3 
October 2013. This case has expanded the definition of accessibility of infringing content, overruling a previous 
line of cases that held mere accessibility to be insufficient in the absence of targeting. See Joined Cases C-
585/08 and C-144/09 Peter Pammer [2010] ECR I-12527; Case C-5/11 Titus Donner, 21 June 2012; Case C-
173/11 Sportradar, 18 October 2012; Case C-144/09 Hotel Alpenhof. For a critical commentary see Martin 
Husovec, “Jurisdiction on the Internet after Pinckney”, International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law(IIC), 9, 2 (2014) 9 (2): 108-109. 
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reference made by the French Cour de cassation,194 questioning the lower court’s 
interpretation of article 5 (3) of the Brussels Regulation that jurisdiction for a prohibitory 
injunction against the sale of a product on foreign websites can only be obtained where those 
websites specifically target the public in the country of application.195 Specifically, the 
French court asked the CJEU to clarify whether article 5(3) is to be interpreted as ‘meaning 
that, in the event of an alleged tortious interference (i.e., a manufatcturer failing to respect the 
conditions of a selective distribution network) by means of online offers for sale on a number 
of websites operated in various Member States, an authorized distributor which considers that 
it has been adversely affected has the right to bring an action seeking an injunction 
prohibiting the resulting unlawful interference in the courts of the territory in which the 
online content is or was accessible’, or whether ‘some other clear connecting factor’ must be 
present196. Having ruled in favor of the former approach, i.e. that accessibility of content in a 
particular country is sufficient, the Court provided one further incentive for selective patent 
enforcement venues. Following this interpretation, SEP holders could pick the most favorable 
forum for their infringement lawsuits simply on the premise that goods implementing the 
standard are sold on a website that is accessible from that jurisdiction, and subsequently 
obtain a rejoinder of connected proceedings initiated elsewhere in EU.   
4.2 Exclusive rules 
 
The Brussels Regulations also contain rules on exclusive jurisdiction: in certain specific 
cases, jurisdiction must be based in a certain member state, irrespective of the concurrence of 
criteria identified by the rules for general or alternative fora. Article 22 of the Brussels I 
Regulation (24 Recast Regulation) contains a list identifying such fora in which jurisdiction 
must be based. For patent disputes, the relevant section is paragraph 4:197  
“in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks, 
designs, or other similar rights required to be deposited or registered, irrespective of 
whether the issue is raised by way of an action or as a defense, the courts of the Member 
State in which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken place or is under 
the terms of a Community instrument or an international convention deemed to have 
taken place.”198 
                                                          
194 Case C-618/15, Concurrence Sàrl v Samsung Electronics France SAS, Amazon Services Europe Sàrl 
[ECLI:EU:C:2016:976]. 
195 The dispute at the root of this preliminary reference originated from an alleged breach by Concurrence (a 
retailer specialized in consumer electronics) of a prohibition on resale of Samsung’s products outside a selective 
distribution network and a marketplace. Concurrence claimed not to be bound by the contractual clause on 
which Samsung based its claim, as it was not imposed to other members of the selective distribution network, 
particularly Amazon. After the Court ruled in favor of Amazon, rejecting that defense, Concurrence initiated 
proceedings against Amazon to request removal of Samsung’s goods from several European domain names of 
its website (French, German, English, Spanish and Italian). The French Cour d’appel in Paris declared that the 
case did not fall within its jurisdiction because of the foreign character of Amazon’s domain names, which were 
not targeted at the French public exclusively.  
196 Id. 
197 Article 22(4) Brussels I Regulation, article 24(4) Recast Regulation.  
198 Emphasized text was amended with the Recast Regulation. This was mainly a codification of an earlier 
judgment made by the CJEU in Case C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen und 
Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG (GAT v Luk), [ECLI:EU:C:2006:457], in which the CJEU decided that a court 
may not decide on the validity of a foreign patent, regardless of the way in which the issue of validity arises in 
the proceedings. 
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Clearly, the rationale for the existence of this category is that the grant of such rights 
constitutes exercise of national sovereignty, a determination of which should not be left to the 
determination of foreign courts. This is primarily ensured by the mechanism established by 
article 25 Brussels I Regulation (27 Recast), according to which any court seized with a 
matter over which courts of another member State have exclusive jurisdiction shall declare 
inadmissibility of its own motion. However, the absence of a clear stand on whether a court 
in such circumstances should decline jurisdiction or merely stay the proceedings waiting for 
the outcome of the validity challenge has led to different applications of the ruling across 
Europe: for example, the Dutch Supreme Court has held that it simply may stay the 
proceedings if the applicant asks so199, while the UK High Court took the stricter stance of 
requiring suspension200. The midway approach of requiring suspension for a limited time201 
was suggested by the European Commission’s Hess Report, recommending: 
“To vest the courts seized with infringement proceedings with power to monitor the 
interdependence of infringement proceedings and proceedings aimed at the 
declaration of invalidity of intellectual property right.[..] Should they have substantial 
prospect of success the court may suspend its proceedings for a limited period of time 
for the defendant to obtain a judgment on the invalidity issue202”. 
Since this approach was not taken up by the Recast, there is a concrete advantage for patent 
holders suing for infringement in those countries that, like the Netherlands or like Germany 
(due to the bifurcated nature of its proceedings)203, require some evidence of the likelihood of 
success of a claim of patent invalidity before suspending infringement proceedings.  
 
4.3 Prorogation of jurisdiction 
 
Parties may also choose by agreement the court that will have jurisdiction in case of a 
dispute: ‘if the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that a court or the courts of a 
Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes (…), that court or those courts 
shall have jurisdiction (...). Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed 
otherwise.’204 This provision thus allows an SEP holder and an implementer to determine 
upfront the courts of which member state will have jurisdiction for any conflicts arising in the 
negotiation process. Even more latitude in this regard is offered under the Recast Regulation, 
which, unlike Brussels I, does not require any party to be domiciled in the member state of 
the chosen forum. From a patent law perspective, it is not hard to imagine that this will lead 
                                                          
199 Hoge Raad [Duch Supreme Court] November 30, 2007, Roche v Primus. It should be noted that this solution 
would appear in contrast with both the letter of the article 25 (referring to “shall”) and its spirit (namely, the fact 
that that the imperative nature of the rule of exclusive jurisdiction empowers a Court to take such decision 
irrespective of a corresponding request by the defendant). 
200 Coin Controls Ltd v Suzo International (UK) Ltd [1999] Ch 33. 
201 This approach towards invalidity defenses was adopted also in Switzerland by a Swiss Commercial Court e, 
ordering a stay of the (trademark) infringement proceedings for six weeks in order to allow the defendant to file 
action for invalidation s before the OHIM, but directing proceedings to resume in case of failure to do so in the 
allotted time. See Commercial Court (Handelsgericht) Zurich, judgment of 23 October 2006, HG 050410, 
Eurojobs Personaldienstleistungen SA v Eurojob AG, 2006, 854; confirmed by the Swiss Federal Court, 
judgment of 4 April 2007, I. Zivilabteilung 4C,439/2006. 
202 Burkhard Hess, Thomas Pfeiffer and Peter Schlosser, “Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in 
the Member States”, September 2007, p. 822. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf. 
203 Graham & Van Zeebroeck, supra note 150, p. 672. 
204 Article 23 Brussels I Regulation, article 25 Recast Regulation. 
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to an increasing number of patent infringement cases in Germany (already receiving 
approximately 66% of patent litigaton in Europe)205 and more specifically the LG Düsseldorf, 
which already reportedly receives 50% of cases in Germany206. 
 
4.4 Provisional measures 
For provisional measures, parties can start proceedings before the courts of any member state 
which allows such measures, even if the courts of another member state have jurisdiction as 
to the substance of the matter.207 This is the case even if the courts of another Member State 
have exclusive jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. Logically, in these 
circumstances the court seized for the injunctions will have to apply the law of the state 
where the patent was issued, and determine accordingly the probability of success on the 
merit and the likelihood of irreparability. Yet what wasn’t clear until the CJEU’s judgment in 
Solvay v. Honeywell208 was whether a court would be entitled to enter a preliminary 
injunction in the presence of a validity challenge raised as counterclaim.209 The CJEU 
responded that such injunction may be granted nonetheless, unless the court seized considers 
that there is a reasonable, non-negligible possibility that the patent invoked would be declared 
invalid by the competent court210. Though representing a surprise for those who viewed 
jurisdiction for provisional measures as independent and separate from the substantive merit 
of the claims211, this judgment constitutes a welcome step towards a sensible management of 
multi-jurisdictional claims, making it more feasible for patent holders to seek provisional 
measures where they see fit.  
At the same time, the Solvay judgment was disappointing in failing to address to the 
important question raised by the referring Dutch court concerning the definition of the 
“connecting link” required between the subject-matter of the provisional measures sought and 
the territorial jurisdiction of the EU Member State of the court seised212. While the Advocate 
General referred to the need to consider primarily the likely effectiveness of the measures 
(especially if extraterritorial), and therefore the enforcement procedure of the Member State 
of the court seised213, the silence of the CJEU on this specific point raised by the referring 
court leaves the matter rather nebulous, opening opportunities for patent holders to show 
creative “connecting links” to bring proceedings before the most advantageous courts. 
 
4.5 Lis pendens 
 
Specific rules govern the ability of courts to hear disputes which are either identical or related 
                                                          
205 Ralph Minderop, Arwed Burrichter and Natalie Kirchhofer, “Cross-border patent litigation in Europe: change 
is coming”, IAM (http://www.iam-media.com/intelligence/IAM-Life-Sciences/2015/Articles/Cross-border-
patent-litigation-in-Europe-change-is-coming). 
206 Graham and Van Zeebroeck, supra n 171, 671. 
207 Article 31 Brussels I Regulation, article 35 Recast Regulation. 
208 Case C-616/10, Solvay v. Honeywell [ECLI:EU:C:2012:445]. 
209 As mentioned, in case of proceedings about the registration or validity of deposited or registered rights, the 
courts of the member state of registration have exclusive jurisdiction. See article 22(4) Brussels I Regulation, 
article 24(4) Recast Regulation. 
210 Solvay v. Honeywell, supra note 208, paras. 49-50. 
211 See Paul L.C. Torremans, “The Way Forward for Cross--Border intellectual Property Litigation: Why GAT 
Cannot Be the Answer”, Intellectual Propety and Private International Law, S. Leible and A. Ohly ed., 
(Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2009): 203. 
212 Case C-391/95, Van Uden [1998] ECR I-7091. 
213 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalon [2012] EUR-Lex CELEX 62010CJ0616, para. 53. 
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actions are pending in the courts of another Member State. The decision to exercise 
jurisdiction in the latter situation is a matter left to judicial discretion, conceivably on the 
recognition of the complexity of defining what constitutes a sufficiently related case.214 In 
contrast, if proceedings between the same parties and involving the same cause of action are 
brought before the courts of different member states, the dispositive rule is that the first court 
seized shall have jurisdiction (save in those circumstances in which parties have agreed to 
attribute disputes to the exclusive jurisdiction of another court)215, whereas any court other 
than the first seized shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until the court first seized 
established jurisdiction, and courts that were later seized shall decline jurisdiction.216 
Unfortunately, the automatisms generated by this set of rules also gives rise to dilatory 
litigation techniques, including so called “torpedoes”217, consisting in filing actions for 
declaratory judgment in States where the proceedings to decide on jurisdiction and/or on the 
merits is likely to take a significant amount of time (typically, Italy and Belgium). The 
problem of torpedoes has been a key issue in the discussions for the reform of the 
Regulation218. The Commission proposed in 2012 to have the court first seized establish 
jurisdiction within 6 months, unless exceptional circumstances make this impossible. 
However, the proposal did not make it to the final text of the Recast Regulation, which 
addressed only part of the problem by creating an exception to the general rule of priority for 
the court first seized: where a seized court has jurisdiction based on contractual agreement 
between parties219, that court has priority regardless of which court was first seized.220 
According to that provision, ‘any court of another Member State shall stay the proceedings 
until such time as the court seized on the basis of the agreement declares that it has no 
jurisdiction under the agreement’, and shall decline jurisdiction after the court designated in 
the agreement has established jurisdiction.221 This exception was deemed necessary in order 
to ‘enhance the effectiveness of exclusive choice-of-court agreements and to avoid abusive 
litigation tactics’222, but left the problem of torpedo actions unaddressed as far as other cases 
of lis pendens are concerned. The result is that patent holders have a strong incentive to 
include favorable exclusive forum selection clauses in their licensing agreements, while they 
are still exposed to infringers’ forum shopping in case where there is no licensing or specific 
agreement on forum selection. 
4.6 Will the Unified Patent Court help to overcome the coordination problem?  
 
As documented, despite the efforts to streamline jurisdiction in EU through the Recast 
Regulation and some leading decisions taken by the CJEU, significant room remains for 
forum shopping by patent holders. The rightholder whose rights are (allegedly) infringed can 
                                                          
214 Article 28 Brussels I Regulation, article 30 Recast Regulation. 
215 Article 25 Brussels I Regulation, article 27 Recast Regulation. 
216 Article 27 Brussels I Regulation, article 29 Recast Regulation. 
217 The name was coined in an article in the mid-nineties by Italian scholar Mario Franzosi. See Mario Franzosi, 
“Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo”, European Intellectual Property Review 7 (1997): 382. 
218 See European Commission, 14.12.2010, COM(2010) 748 final, 2010/0383 (COD), “Proposal for a 
Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters”http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/com_2010_748_en.pdf . 
See also Ian Bergson, “The death of the torpedo action? The practical operation of the Recast's reforms to 
enhance the protection for exclusive jurisdiction agreements within the European Union”, Journal of Private 
International Law, 11,1 (2015): 1-30. 
219 Based on article 25 Recast Regulation and 27 Recast Regulation. 
220 Article 29(1) Recast Regulation in combination with article 31(2) Recast Regulation. 
221 Article 31(2) and 31(3) Recast Regulation. 
222 Recital 22 of the Recast Regulation. 
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readily choose between several fora to intiate legal proceedings: for example, courts of the 
member state where the defendant is domiciled; courts of the place where a contract is 
performed; courts for the place where the harmful event of tort, delict or quasi-delict occurred 
or may occur; or courts for the place where one of the defendants is domiciled -provided that 
the claims against multiple defendants are closely connected and there is a risk of 
irreconcilable judgments. Additionally, and very importantly in the case of SEPs where a 
central role is played by preliminary injunctions, provisional measures can be requested to the 
courts of any forum under which jurisdiction can be established, with the caveats that a 
“connecting link” must exist between the measure sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the 
court seized, and that jurisdiction for such provisional measures may (but must not) be 
affected by validity challenges raised by the defendant. And while for the time being, the 
attractiveness of extraterritorial jurisdiction is limited by the geographical scope of the 
remedies that a seized court can impose, there are indications that these limitations may be 
faltering, in which case the magnitude of forum shopping in patent litigation is likely to 
increase significantly.  
Against this backdrop of imperfect coordination, one may expect to see a solution in the 
Unified Patent Court (UPC), which is due to enter into force upon completion of the 
ratification process of the UPC agreement223 by Germany and the United Kingdom, and the 
reaching of thirteen ratifications (out of the twentyfive contracting states) of the Protocol on 
Provisional Application224. The UPC was conceived specifically in the belief that the 
fragmented market for patents and the significant variations between national courts systems 
harm innovation, “in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises which have 
difficulties to enforce their patents and to defend themselves against unfounded claims and 
claims relating to patents which should be revoked”225. This stated rationale echoes the 
sentiment behind the creation of the Unitary Patent (UP) in Regulation 1257/2012226, which 
was to “foster scientific and technological advances and the functioning of the internal 
market by making access to the patent system easier, less costly and legally secure”227. 
However, while one can concede that the arrangements made under these two legal 
instruments are likely to aliviate for litigants some of the costs and complexity of the existing 
regime228, doubts can be casted on the sufficiency of those arrangements to really provide 
                                                          
223 Agreeement on a Unified Patent Court (2013/C 175/01), published on 20.6.2013 (OJEU C175/1)  
224 For the latest update on the progress maede towards UPC, see https://www.unified-patent-
court.org/news/progress-unified-patent-court-project-21-september-2017. The specific conditions originally 
established for the entry into force of the UPC were: (1) The deposit of the thirteenth instrument of ratification, 
including Germany, the United Kingdom and France (the three Contracting Member States in which the highest 
number of European patents had effect in 2012). (2) The date of entry into force of the amendments to 
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (Brussels I Regulation) concerning its relationship with the Agreement. See 
https://www.unified-patent-court.org/faq/entry-force-and-preparatory-work 
225 UPC Agreement, supra note 223, second recital. 
226 Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2012 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection, OJ L 361, 
31.12.2012, p. 1–8 
227 Id., Recital 4 
228 In addition to the obvious advantage of the UP for patent applicants, who will not need to navigate the 
complexities and hidiosyncracies of diverging national frameworks, the UPC significantly simplifies 
enforcement by automatically conferring cross-border jurisdiction. Furthermore, in the spirit of making the 
patent system more accessible and disencourage its opportunitistic use by large players against small and 
medium-sized enterprises, the  UPC will charge value-based fees for the initiators of actions of infringement, 
damages actions and declarations of non-infringment as well as the counterclaims of non-infringment, in 
particular when the estimated exceeds EUR 500.000. See art. 36 of the UPC Agreement and art. 22, 60, 74, and 
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legal security and prevent patent holders from threatening small and medium enterprises with 
unmeritorious claims.  
The fundamental novelty of the UP is the creation of a uniform patent protection across the 
territory of the participating member states. This uniformity distinguishes the UP from the 
traditional European Patent (EP), which consists of a bundle of national rights that once 
obtained can be enforced and invalidated in the respective European countries in accordance 
with the criteria set out in national law229. However, the characteristics of the court system 
designed for the enforcement of that uniform protection raise questions as to the degree of 
uniformity that can effectively be guaranteed.  This is because the UPC agreement establishes 
a court with exclusive competence and distributed architecture for the settlement of disputes 
on UP. The architecture is “distributed” in the sense that the UPC will have local and regional 
divisions in its contracting states, in addition to a central division (specialized in proceedings 
for invalidation and declarations of non-infringment) composed by three subsections in 
different locations,230 and a court of appeal based in Luxembourg. While all divisions will 
apply the same rules of procedure and the jurisprudence of the court of appeal, who in turn 
will be bound by the interpretations of the ECJ, one can expect that variations in practices 
and interpretations will arise across the different divisions. This is but a natural evolution for 
a specialized patent court that is integrated into the EU ecosystem, where a minimum core of 
protection is complemented by the freedom of Member States to define their rules in 
accordance with the doctrine of national procedural autonomy231. 
For example, it is logical that open-ended concepts, such as the sufficiency of the evidence of 
infringement and harm to either party in case of refusal to grant a preliminary injunction232, 
will give rise to diverging views in the absence of more specific guidance at the EU level.  
This reasoning applies with even more force having regard to the lack of a unified framework 
for SEP remedies and counterclaims, as discussed in section 2. To complicate the picture, one 
should also consider that Regulation 1057/2012 explicitly preserves the application of 
(potentially national) competition law233 -although the UPC retains exclusive competence on 
counterclaims concerning licenses234. Thus, implementers will still be able to pick the most 
favorable jurisdiction for antitrust litigation over injunctions sought before the UPC, and 
depending on the interpretation of the scope of such exclusive competence, even invoke the 
application of the relevant national law as a defense before the UPC.  
Leaving the antitrust realm aside, it is clear that the potential for forum shopping by patent 
holders remains alive. In particular, patent holders retain wide discretion in the choice of 
forum under the UPC Agreement, as proceedings can be initiated before the local or regional 
division of the country where the actual or threatened infringement has occurred or may 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
133 of the 18th Draft of the UPC Rules of Procedure. 
229 Art. 2 of the European Patent Convention, OJ EPO 2001, Special edition No. 4, p. 55.  
230 Art. 6, 7 and 9 of the UPC Agreement. 
231 The doctrine of national procedural autonomy recognizes the power of States to regulate above and 
beyond the reach of EU law, provided that such regulation does not compromise the effectiveness the rights 
conferred under EU law (principle of effectiveness) and does not discriminate between claims of national law 
and claims of EU law (principle of equivalence or non-discrimination). See Case C-312/93, Peterbroeck [1995] 
ECR I-4599.  
232 See art. 62 (2) and 62 (4) of the UPC Agreement; and 211 (2) and (3) of the 18th Draft of the UPC Rules of 
Procedure. 
233 Art. 15 of the UPC Agreement. 
234 Art 32 (1) (a) of the UPC Agreement. 
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occur235, or alternatively, where a defendant has its place of residence, principal place of 
business or (in the absence of the two) merely a place of business236. This is of course in 
addition to the opportunities for forum shopping available for the enforcement of national 
patents, which will remain untouched by the entry into force of the UP and the UPC.  
Having said that, a couple of notable improvements must be acknowledged when comparing 
the governance of parallel claims under the UPC Agreement with that offered by private 
international law rules applicable to national patent infringement suits, namely: (a) the 
increased stringency of the connection between multiple defendants: patent holders can bring 
a common action only if defendants have a commercial relationship and the action relates to 
the same alleged infringement; and; (b) the reduced ability of defendants to halt infringement 
proceedings with strategic suits for declaration of non-infringment (the mechanism at the 
origin of “torpedo” actions described above in section 4.5): patent holders can trigger the 
suspension of declaratory proceedings by filing an infringement suit in the venue of choice 
within three months from the date the declaratory action was initiated before the central 
division; (c) the elimination of any automatism in the bifurcation of proceedings of 
infringement and validity following an invalidity counterclaim: local or regional divisions 
have the discretion to determine whether to consider validity and infringement as part of the 
same proceedings, or refer the whole case to the central division, or alternatively, refer the 
invalidity counterclaim to the central division, and either proceed with the infringement claim 
or suspend that proceeding pending the decision on validity. Furthermore, adding to the 
general streamlining of the procedures with regard to handling parallel claims, the UPC Rules 
of Procedure clarify that proceedings shall be conducted in a way which will normally allow 
the final oral hearing on the issues of infringement and validity at first instance to take place 
within one year237.  
It should also be noted that the UPC will have jurisdiction over EP disputes as well; however, 
during the so called “transitional period” of seven years since the entry into force of the UPC 
this jurisdiction will be alternative to national jurisdiction over EP, and EP holders will be 
given the opportunity to “opt-out” of the exclusivity of the UPC for the entire duration of the 
patents filed or obtained in that period. That has led to speculations that patent owners will 
opt-in their strong patents (to avail of the one-stop enforcement) and opt-out weaker patents 
(to avoid the one-stop invalidation risk), while others will want to opt-out their “crown jewel 
patents”238. Thus, this scenario seems to indicate more, rather than less opportunities for 
strategic enforcement of European Patents in the years to come, at least in the short to 
medium-term.  
  
5. Summary and Conclusions: Necessary Harmonization and How To Achieve It 
5.1 The Need for A Fully Harmonized EU Position  
                                                          
235 Art 33 (1) (a) of the UPC Agreement. 
236 Art. 33 (1) (b) of the UPC Agreement. Additionally, actions can be brought before the central division where 
a defendant does not have residence or place of business in the territory of a participating Contracting 
Member State, or the Contracting Member State concerned does not host a local division and does not 
participate in a regional division (in which case, the central division is the only option). See art. 33 (1) of the 
UPC Agreement. 
237 Recital 7 of the 18th Draft of the UPC Rules of Procedure 
238 See Luke McDonagh, “Exploring Perspectives of the Unified Patent Court and Unitary Patent Within the 
Business and Legal Communities”, Report for the UK Intellectual Property Office, IPO Publication (2014), p. 30. 
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This article has reviewed the evolving legal framework for SEP disputes in Europe, with 
specific focus on the antitrust treatment of conduct by an SEP holder consisting in seeking 
injunctive reliief for a FRAND-encumbered patent. As outlined in section 1, the importance 
of defining the antitrust treatment of this particular issue is paramount given the crucial role 
of both patents and standards in promoting innovation, as well as the inherent tendency of 
FRAND to generate disputes in relation to the enforcement of SEPs.  
A review of the legal framework (section 2.1) and the EU case-law prior to the rise of SEP 
disputes (section 2.2 (a)) revealed two elements of difficulty in the application of article 102 
to the aforementioned conduct: the identification of a dominant position in SEP markets, and 
a consistent theory of harm. In particular, it is not clear how the traditional definition of 
dominance applies to markets construed through “artificial” tools such as declarations of 
essentiality of SEPs and FRAND commitments to SSOs, and it is unclear what exact 
circumstances warrant antitrust intervention in these peculiar markets.  
The case-law on injunctive relief and abuse of dominance for SEPs prior to Huawei v ZTE 
offered two diametrically opposite approaches to the latter issue, one more patent-friendly 
(Orange Book, section 2.2 (b)) and another more implementer-friendly (Motorola and 
Samsung, section 2.2 (c)), thus leading the German Supreme Court to ask the CJEU in 
Huawei which approach was to be favored as a matter of EU law. Section 3.1 explained that 
CJEU addressed the question providing some clarification, in two different ways: first, by 
ruling that the line of case-law on refusal to license intellectual property is applicable, and 
identifying two exceptional circumstances that warrant the systematic imposition of a duty to 
license: the standardization process -which plays a fundamental role in fostering follow-on 
innovation through interoperability- and the existence of a FRAND commitment –which 
creates legitimate expectations on third parties. Despite the welcome clarification, however, 
the ruling also muddled the waters in circumscribing the theory of harm to a situation in 
which an SEP holder can “prevent products manufactured by competitors from appearing or 
remaining on the market and, thereby, reserve to itself the manufacture of the products in 
question”239. This is because it remains open to interpretation whether an SEP holder is 
considered to be a “competitor” in all markets relying on the use of an SEP (as reference to 
legitimate expectation of “third parties” would suggest), and whether the CJEU only 
addressed one manifestation of abuse of dominant position without ruling out the 
applicability of another line of cases, namely that of exploitative abuses. National 
courts’subsequent interpretation of Huawei illustrates the significance of these uncertainties, 
vacillating between exclusionary and exploitative theories of harm (section 3.2 (a)).  
Secondly, the Huawei ruling attempted to provide legal certainty by defining a safe harbor 
both for SEP holders to escape liability, and for standard implementers to be able to raise a 
FRAND defense in the context of infringement proceedings. However, as illustraded by 
section 3.2 (b), the high level of abstraction in which the safe harbors have been defined 
raises questions of effectiveness of the protection they are supposed to confer. For example, 
while the SEP holder is advised to send a notice to the implementer about the alleged 
infringement of its SEP and make an offer to license on FRAND terms, it is not clear how 
much information should be provided at each step of the process, so that the implementer can 
verify the existence of infringement and the FRAND-ness of the offer received; similarly 
uncertain is the meaning of the implementer’s safe harbor of “diligently responding in 
accordance with recognized commercial practices and in good faith”, especially with regard 
to whether it is triggered independently from the SEP holder’s duty to make a FRAND offer. 
Further interpretative questions arise on the acceptability of portfolio license offers and 
                                                          
239 Huawei v ZTE, supra note 7, para. 52. 
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counteroffers, and the permissibility of conduct outside the safe harbor. In addition, one may 
wonder whether the implementer’s safe harbor devised in Samsung, resting on the submission 
of FRAND to determination by an independent third party, retains any relevance in a post-
Huawei world.  
All these interpretative issues create fertile ground for divergent interpretations across the 
EU, paving the road for forum shopping. Section 4 documented the malleability of 
jurisdiction in the applicable EU rules on private international law, in particular the Brussels 
Recast Regulation and the case-law interpreting its precedecessors (the Brussels Convention 
and the Brussels I Regulation). An analysis of those rules shows that SEP holders are able to 
pick the most favorable forum for their infringement lawsuits on multiple grounds, including 
the place where the harm occurred or may occurr, the place where the relevant licensing 
agreement (if any) is performed, the place where the defendant or even just one of the 
defendants is domiciled, and perhaps most crucially, the place designated by the parties via 
agreement. The Brussels Recast also fails to resolve the potential issues arising from strategic 
litigation by the alleged infringers, who are able to stall litigation in certain fora by invoking 
exclusive jurisdiction for validity challenges and taking advantage of the automatisms of the 
rules on lis pendens, although in certain countries more effectively than others. As illustrated 
in section 4.6, the Unified Patent Court Agreement would marginally improve that situation 
as far as Unified Patents are concerned, but does nothing to address the problems of 
coordination in relation to the enforcement of national patents, and appears to create even 
more opportunities for strategic litigation with regard to European patents. 
Regrettably, this fragmented panorama leaves us with a troubling prospect: first, the 
inconsistencies between various national legal systems might drive more litigation than 
optimal, diverting resources away from research and development.  Second, the lack of legal 
certainty can have significant chilling effects both on SEP holders and on potential 
implementers, thereby undermining trust in the standardization process and the ability of the 
EU to promote incremental innovation, as well as the ability of EU consumers to enjoy 
standard-based technologies.  It is therefore of crucial importance for the EU legal framework 
for SEP disputes to ensure a minimum of consistency by prescribing a nucleus of rules under 
full, rather than partial, harmonization.  
5.2. Pathways to harmonization: means, scope and time matter 
The focus of this article has so far been retrospective, with the exception of a few 
considerations about the prospects for litigation under the existing framework and with the 
entering into force of the UPC. To complete the picture, it is important to consider the role 
that the EU can play in the future to address the shortcomings of the current framework and 
increase the level of harmonization at the IP/antitrust interface. Three options are available to 
that end: progressive development of the case-law via preliminary references, legislative 
intervention, and administrative priority-setting.  
The first option is ideally preferable, as it leaves room for national experimentation and 
allows the law to develop organically, taking into account pros and cons of different solutions 
and with reference to the peculiarities of national frameworks, which are otherwise difficult 
to accurately capture. However, this process is by nature haphazardous -because the issues 
brought to the CJEU depend on the arguments made by litigating parties- and remarkably 
slow240, which is problematic in dealing with fast-pacing technologies. Arguably, this route is 
                                                          
240 The average duration of a preliminary reference procedure is 15 months. See “Statistics concerning judicial 
activity in 2016: the duration of proceedings continues its downward trend, to the benefit of citizens”, CJEU 
Press Release No 17/17, available at https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-
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the most appropriate to deal with questions of internal consistency of EU competition law, 
such as the role of exploitative abuses in SEP disputes, which are bound to come to the CJEU 
given the present lack of clarity.   
Evidently, not all issues can be solved under a competition law framing, and a legislative 
solution appears preferable to create a level playing field for all SEP holders, independently 
from the existence of a dominant position or even of a specific FRAND commitment241. 
However, legislation suffers from the opposite problem compared to jurisprudential 
development, as it risks overreacting to a perceived problem and freezing its understanding of 
technology to a particular state, which quickly becomes obsolete in light of technological 
development242. This is exacerbated by the fact that legislations are often the result of 
compromises between contrasting positions, with the risk of legislators being informed by an 
imperfect understanding of market processes. Such concern is particularly pronounced for a 
legislation that would steer towards a particular methodology for the evaluation of FRAND 
terms, or prescribe the rules that should form part of the IPR policy of an SSO243.  
In light of the above, the administrative route strikes as the most suitable option for bringing 
uniformity to the framework for SEP disputes: by identifying priorities and best practices, 
administrative action could provide the necessary guidance to enhance predictability without 
simultaneously running into the problems of rigidity and obsolescence. In particular, the 
European Commission could address the outstanding issues by issuing soft law, and 
promoting its adoption at the national level through the European Competition Network and 
other interactions with national contact points. For this reason, the Commission’s publication 
on 10 April 2017 of a Roadmap for “Standard Essential Patents for a European digitalised 
economy244” should be welcomed as a concrete step in the right direction. That initiative, 
taken jointly by DG Growth and DG Connect and supposedly leading to a Commission 
Communication in the second quarter of 2017 (sic!), is consistent with other Commission’s 
initiatives on standardization245 and with the prominent importance placed by the 
Commission on interoperability standards246. The Roadmap specifically commits to providing 
“guidance complementing existing jurisprudence on enforcement in areas such as mutual 
obligations in licensing negotiations before recourse to injunctive relief, portfolio licensing 
and the role of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms”, which certainly would go a long 
way to assuage the concerns flagged in this article about the implementation of Huawei.  
It is more concerning however that, in the pursuit of the aim of improving interoperability 
and trust in the standardization process, the initiative promises to go beyond the already 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
02/cp170017en.pdf.  
241 See in this sense Larouche & Zingales, supra note 32. 
242 This is typically known as the Collingridge dilemma, also known in regulatory theory as the “pacing 
problem”, or “regulatory disconnection”. See Pierre Larouche and Anna Butenko, “Regulation for 
Innovativeness or Regulation of Innovation?”, Law, Innovation and Technology 7, 1 (2015): 65. 
243 See in this sense Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Joshua D. Wright, Bruce H. Kobayashi, Douglas H. Ginsburg, 
“Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, on The 
Communication from The Commission on Standard Essential Patents for a European Digitalised Economy” 
George Mason University Law & Economics Research Paper Series 17-22, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2960291. 
244 Roadmap for “Standard Essential Patents for a European digitalised economy”, GROW F5 (CNECT F3 
ASSOCIATED), 10.4.2017. 
245 E.g. Communication “ICT Standardisation Priorities for the Digital Single Market” (COM(2016)176 of 
19.4.2016); and Communication “Digitising European Industry. Reaping the full benefits of a Digital Single 
Market (COM(2016) 110 of 19.4.2016). 
246 See, in addition to the above-mentioned policy documents, the Commission’s decision in Motorola, para. 
416. 
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challenging task of tackling “risks of uncertainty in enforcement”. In particular, it raises some 
eyebrow that the Commission announces its intention to deliver, in the same Communication 
originally to be issued within a couple of months: (a) a guidance on “the boundaries of 
FRAND and core valuation principles”; and (b) a set of “best practice recommendations to 
increase transparency on SEP exposure, including to SSOs to improve value and accessibility 
of SEPs databases and to bring more precision and rigour into the essentiality declaration”. 
Valuation of FRAND rates and identification of patent essentiality are both complex and 
intrinsically context-dependent issues, which require accurate reflection of the characteristics 
of the markets in question. On the one hand, providing guidance on core FRAND principles 
could dispel some of the confusion in the definition of reasonable royalties, for example 
concerning the possibility to account for the network effects derived to the patent from its 
incorporation in the standard or to charge different rates depeding on the specific use made of 
the patent, or the reference to a benchmark of hypothetical ex ante negotiation between 
licensor and licensee in a context in wich the decision to adopt the standard was made 
collectively by the SSO (thus potentially reflecting a compromise between different measures 
of willingness to pay between implementers). On the other hand, in doing so the Commission 
should be wary of the risks involved with replacing –even if merely in the form of 
recommendation- decisions that belong to the marketplace, such as the choice of the most 
appropriate FRAND methodology for a given set of circumstances247. Favoring one option 
over another can have serious distributional consequences among affected stakeholders, 
potentially interfering with legitimate business models248. By the same token, while 
increasing transparency on SEP exposure and bringing more precision and rigour into 
essentiality declarations undoubtedly constitute a laudable goal, the implications of 
encouraging a more “hands on” approach by SSOs may be significant, most notably in terms 
of the associated costs for implementers and the accessibility of standardization more 
generally249. Formulating best practices can pave the way for virtuous competition between 
SSOs, but at the same time, if strongly pushed by the Commission’s agenda, it may end up 
limiting SSOs’ ability to formulate their requirements catering to different needs and types of 
undertakings250. 
                                                          
247 This was the case for instance with the Federal Trade Commission’s Study on Patent Remedies, which 
among other recommendations cautioned against the application of the Entire Market Value Rule.  See Federal 
Trade Commission, The Evolving IP Marketplace, supra note 15, p 211. 
248 An example of this is the withdrawal in the standardization process by IEEE Standard Association’s 
members following the Association’s patent policy update, which recommended to base FRAND on the “value 
of the relevant functionality of the smallest saleable compliant implementation” of a patent, as opposed to the 
more conventional basis in the industry of the final product incorporating the patent. See Ron Katznelson, 
‘Decline in non-duplicate licensing Letters of Assurance (LOAs) from Product/System companies for IEEE 
standards’, Presentation at IEEE GLOBECOM, San Diego (December 2015) 
https://works.bepress.com/rkatznelson/80/. See more generally, Zingales & Kanevskaia, supra note 17. 
249 By way of illustration, the costs identified by a recent Report prepared on behalf of the European 
Commission in relation to a preliminary review of patent essentiality are of €1800 to 2600 per patent, which is 
then likely to be shared or trickled down through licensing prices to implementers. See Pierre Régibeau, 
Raphaël De Coninck and Hans Zenger, “Transparency, Predictability, and Efficiency of SSO-based 
Standardization and SEP Licensing: A Report for the European Commission” (June 2016), p 57, 90. 
250 One of the most significant changes stemming from the adoption of a more stringent approach to essentiality 
declarations would be the departure from the longstanding policy of SSOs to maintain “lightweight” due 
diligence requirements, by not requiring any patent searches. See Keith Maskus and Stephen A. Merrill, Patent 
Challenges for Standard-Setting in the Global Economy: Lessons from Information and Communication 
Technology (National Academy Press 2013), p. 41.  
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It may be that the contentiousness of these matters explains why, well into the last quarter of 
2017, the announced Communication has not yet seen the light. Defining core principles for 
these complex issues without forcing its hand is a concrete challenge that the Commission 
has set itself up to, and one that can affect the chances of success in the adoption of the entire 
Communication at the national level. As explained above, one size does not fit all for tackling 
the challenges of SEP disputes. Accordingly, the Commission’s Communication may well 
provide an illustration of both the benefits and the dangers of using soft-law to address 
complex questions about the role of private regulation, in particular concerning practices 
where the market has not yet found its ubi consistam.  
